Utah Law Review
Volume 2023

Number 1

Article 2

1-2023

Flipped Constitutional Supremacy: Inferior Local Law Blocking
Federal Policy
Steven Ferrey
Suffolk University law School, sferrey@suffolk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven Ferrey, Flipped Constitutional Supremacy: Inferior Local Law Blocking Federal Policy, 2023 ULR 65
(2023). https://doi.org/10.26054/0d-6pth-heqw

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Law Review by an authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

FLIPPED CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY: INFERIOR LOCAL LAW
BLOCKING FEDERAL POLICY
Steven Ferrey*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 66
I. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SITING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE ........ 73
A. Climate Change, Changing Generation Technologies ................................. 73
B. Ascending Wind Power Generation .............................................................. 77
C. Wind Cost Decreases, Maximizing Efficiency as Turbine Size Increases,
but Increasing Local Resistance to Wind Siting ................................................. 78
D. Scaling Wind Against Land Use ................................................................... 82
II. SITING SUSTAINABLE WIND POWER INFRASTRUCTURE: LOCAL
POLICE POWER AND STATE ENERGY SITING LAW ................................................. 83
A. Local Implementation of ‘Aesthetic’ Zoning to Bar Sustainable Power....... 84
1. Environmental Overlay Zones................................................................... 84
2. Municipal ‘Aesthetic’ Zoning-Out of Sustainable Wind
Power Turbines .............................................................................................. 85
B. Deference to Local Zoning on Aesthetics of Infrastructure Siting................ 88
C. ‘Aesthetic’ Wind Zoning Challenged in the Courts ...................................... 90
III. NO FEDERAL ROLE AND LIMITED STATE ROLE TO PREEMPT
LOCAL LAND-USE ................................................................................................... 94
A. Uniquely Bifurcated Legal Regulation of U.S. Power .................................. 94
B. Supreme Court: Lack of Federal Energy Preemptive Authority................... 96
C. State Preemption as the Antidote to Supreme Court Limitation
on Federal Authority to Preempt ...................................................................... 100
IV. SUPREMACY CLAUSE INVERSION: INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS SUCCESSFULLY
TO SITE RENEWABLE POWER UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL, STATE,
AND LOCAL LAW................................................................................................... 108
A. Stepping Beyond All Locally Controlled Land............................................ 110
1. Prioritizing Use of a Distinct 30% of U.S. Land..................................... 110
2. Avoiding Land and Local Land-Use Control .......................................... 112
B. Shifting Legal Burdens: Special Permits in Lieu of Local ‘Aesthetic’

*

© 2023 Steven Ferrey. Steven Ferrey is Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law
School and served as Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Since 1993,
Professor Ferrey has served as a primary legal advisor to the World Bank and the United
Nations on their renewable energy and climate change policies. He is the author of more than
100 law review articles and 7 books on energy and environmental law and policy, the most
recent of which are Environmental Law: Examples & Explanations, 9th ed. 2022, Unlocking
the Global Warming Toolbox, 2010, and The Law of Independent Power, 57th ed. 2022.
Professor Ferrey thanks his research assistants, John Geary and Joe Ruggiero, for their
assistance.

65

66

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

Zoning Ordinances ........................................................................................... 114
C. Adopting Preemptive State Wind Energy Siting Law ................................. 116
D. Using the Supreme Court Dean Milk Requirement; Reserving Common
Law Nuisance to Address Wind Generation Project Impacts .......................... 122
1. Supreme Court Minimum “Burden” Requirement ................................. 122
2. Reactivating Common Law Nuisance Doctrine ...................................... 123
3. Distinguishing Common Law Nuisance from Zoning ............................. 126
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 128
INTRODUCTION
The Biden Administration in 2021 successfully enacted unprecedented
landmark infrastructure legislation investing hundreds of billions of dollars to
address global warming on an expedited emergency basis with sustainable energy
infrastructure.1 Further, the Biden Inflation Reduction Act added an unprecedented
$369 billion more of renewable energy climate mitigation spending. 2 However,
these ‘marquee’ legislative successes of President Biden’s term in office advancing
historic federal climate change infrastructure spending is already eclipsed by
municipal governments legally ‘zoning out’ such sustainable infrastructure. This
extraordinary legal elevation of lower-level municipal law resurrected to overrule
national policy occurs despite the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, 3 which
preempts inferior-level government actions. Nonetheless, Supreme Court decisions
recently support inferior-level local control over sustainable infrastructure.4 Tens of
thousands of inferior-level municipal governments in the United States (U.S.) now
exercise the final legal veto on critical U.S. climate policy and infrastructure.5

1

See Brooksany Barrowes, Robert S. Fleishman, Brian C. Greene, Marcia Hook &
Raya B. Treiser Massive Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill Includes Billions in Funding and
Process Improvements for Energy and Infrastructure, KIRKLAND & ELLIS ENERGY BLOG
(Nov. 7, 2021), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/blog-post/2021/08/bipartisaninfrastructure-bill [https://perma.cc/YF6V-PNKB]; see also Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 40105, 135 Stat. 933 (2021) (adding additional criteria for
the federal designation of national interest electric transmission corridors (NIETCs), and
amending section 216 of the Federal Power Act requirements to allow the federal
government to interfere with state transmission citing authority when a state commission
fails to act within one year or denies certain transmission applications under applicable law).
2
Jay Jacobs, The Inflation Reduction Act’s Impact on Clean Energy and EVs, NASDAQ
(Aug. 18, 2022), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/the-inflation-reduction-acts-impact-onclean-energy-and-evs [https://perma.cc/6HSY-LPJG].
3
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
4
See infra Part III.
5
See infra Part II & III.
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The Biden Administration’s unprecedented legislative initiatives on
infrastructure and climate do not address the critical-path legal bottleneck created
by the unfettered discretion of 35,000 separate cities and towns in the U.S.6 Pursuant
to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, and enforced by recent Supreme Court
decisions, 7 tens of thousands of towns exclusively control whether sustainable
infrastructure can or cannot be sited on their land. Numerous cities and towns now
are rolling out and deploying ‘aesthetic’ local zoning to deny cost-effective
renewable energy a place on their land.8
This Article analyzes how municipal governments are frustrating U.S.
sustainable infrastructure policy by deploying inferior-level ‘aesthetic’ zoning
despite the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and the warming climate.
Notwithstanding criticism from Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez calling
this Biden plan “not nearly enough,”9 from Representative Nicole Malliotakis that
the plan will hurt the “middle class and hard-working Americans,” 10 and from
Senator Ben Sasse calling such unprecedented spending “wildly out-of-touch,”11
U.S. success addressing climate change is not dependent solely on the amount of
federal money provided. While a decade or more ago, renewable power
infrastructure was expensive and required federal and state subsidies;12 this is not
the challenge today. With renewable energy technologies to arrest climate warming
now the least expensive energy options,13 the financial incentives and subsidies in

6

Cities 101 – Number of Local Governments, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES,
https://www.nlc.org/resource/cities-101-number-of-local-governments/ [https://perma.cc/P
6QT-DHZG] (last visited Aug. 4, 2022) (“The most recent data from the U.S. Census Bureau
(2012) counted 35,879 general purpose local governments, which includes 19,519 municipal
governments, 16,360 town and township governments, and 3,031 county governments.”).
7
See infra Part III.B.
8
See infra Part II.
9
Eliza Relman, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Criticizes Biden’s $2.25 Trillion
Infrastructure Plan as ‘Not Nearly Enough,’ BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2021, 8:36 AM),
(https://www.businessinsider.com/aoc-says-bidens-225-trillion-infrastructure-plan-is-notnearly-enough-2021-3) [https://perma.cc/4SME-4HGE].
10
Carl Campanile, Bernadette Hogan, Lydia Moynihan & Bruce Golding, Hidden
Costs of Build Back Better: Tax Hikes, IRS on Americans’ Backs, Critics Say, N.Y. POST
(Nov. 24, 2021, 1:50 P.M.), https://nypost.com/2021/11/19/critics-warning-on-hidden-costsof-bidens-build-back-better-agenda/ [https://perma.cc/R32M-FV2U].
11
See Leif Le Mahieu, ‘Nail in the Coffin’: Republican Senator Praises Joe Manchin
for Decision on Build Back Better, DAILY WIRE (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.dailywire.com/
news/nail-in-the-coffin-republican-senator-praises-joe-manchin-for-decision-on-build-back
-better [https://perma.cc/WYJ3-NEAT].
12
See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
13
See id.
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the Biden Administration infrastructure law and Inflation Reduction Act do not
address nor solve the legal bottlenecks imposed by inferior levels of government.
The Third Branch of government does not provide its usual solution: The
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Virginia Uranium v. Warren declares that the
federal government cannot preempt local government land-use regulations related
to low-carbon electric power production.14 Distant neighbors, even when they do not
experience any conventional legal nuisances, can and do prevent renewable wind
turbines from being sited that alter those neighbors’ existing distant scenic views
over property they do not own. 15 Municipal ‘aesthetic’ zoning is no longer an
obscure legal footnote. It is elevated and unilaterally enables any of more than
35,000 local governments counted in the U.S. census to frustrate national sustainable
climate policy and law without any federal checks or balances. The legal
choreography analyzed in this Article has international climate repercussions.
Much is at stake. The international science panel on world climate concluded
that emission of CO2 and other global warming greenhouse gases (GHGs) from
burning fossil fuels for electricity production in lieu of the use of renewable energy
technologies is pushing the world’s climate to the tipping points “that will alter
regional and global environmental balances . . . that are irreversible within the time
span of our current civilization.”16 The Biden Administration’s strategy on climate
states that a delayed transition to renewable power would entail a “higher likelihood
of reaching catastrophic damages or ‘tipping points’ and potentially irreversible
economic impacts.” 17 Controlling the warming climate will require a rapid 45%
diminution of global GHG emissions from 2010 levels, resulting in net-zero GHG
emissions by 2050.18 In response, the Biden Administration pledged to replace all
electric power generation using fossil fuels with renewable energy by 2035,19 and

14

139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019); accord Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
15
These “affected” neighbors often are not close enough to distant wind turbines to
have any “nuisance” impact from renewable wind energy noise, strobe effect, or ice throws
from moving blades. See infra Part IV.D.
16
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, UNEP YEAR BOOK 21 (Catherine
McMullen & Thomas Hayden, eds., 2009).
17
The Long-Term Strategy of the United States: Pathways to Net-Zero Greenhouse Gas
Emissions by 2050, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE & U.S. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT 5, 71 (2021),
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/US_accessibleLTS2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S3CW-5M5S].
18
The Paris Agreement, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement [https://pe
rma.cc/E6D2-RLUM] (last visited Aug. 5, 2022).
19
See Patrick Whittle & Cathy Bussewitz, Biden Faces Steep Challenges to Reach
Renewable Energy Goals, ABC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/
Business/wireStory/biden-faces-steep-challenges-reach-renewable-energy-goals-76219392
[https://perma.cc/D7YY-VXK6].
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the U.S. rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement along with all world nations, which
requires an unprecedented rapid deployment of renewable wind power.20
Electric power is one of humanity’s three most important inventions21 and a
technology essential to the American economy. Since first harnessed by Thomas
Edison in 1876 and first deployed at the end of the nineteenth century,22 electric
power infrastructure has enjoyed exceptions to traditional local zoning through the
exercise of legal eminent domain power.23 Notwithstanding, numerous communities
in the U.S. now ‘aesthetically’ zone-out wind power turbines24 despite these turbines
being the most significant new source of renewable electric power generation in the
country. 25 This Article critically examines how ‘aesthetic’ local zoning law in
numerous communities across the U.S. is now blocking siting of new sustainable
technology. This inversion of authority:

20

See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text; Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman,
Biden Cancels Keystone XL Pipeline and Rejoins Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/climate/biden-paris-climateagreement.html [https://perma.cc/9MEP-GDWG].
21
James Fallows, The 50 Greatest Breakthroughs Since the Wheel, ATLANTIC (Nov.
2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/innovations-list/309536/
[https://perma.cc/3EKS-KYDK].
22
STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION
260–61 (2000) [hereinafter THE NEW RULES].
23
Steven Ferrey, Eminent Domain and Serrated Power, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 171, 204
(2016).
24
See Julia Pyper, 7 Charts that Show Wind Power Is Surging in the US and Abroad,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/7charts-that-show-wind-power-is-surging-in-the-us-and-abroad#gs.thjU7Ls [https://perma.
cc/8TFQ-4XAW].
25
Wind Explained: Electricity Generation from Wind, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last
updated Mar. 30, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/wind/electricity-generationfrom-wind.php [https://perma.cc/9DJF-4423] (noting U.S. total annual electricity generation
from wind in the United States increased from about 6 billion kWh in 2000 to about 300
billion kWh in 2019, and in 2019, wind turbines in the United States were the source of about
7.3% of total U.S. utility-scale electricity generation).
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• Contravenes the Supreme Court’s prohibition in Dean Milk against
burdensome state regulatory restrictions on interstate commerce, 26
notwithstanding that the Supreme Court found electricity to be an article of
interstate commerce, which triggers federal, rather than local, jurisdiction;27
and
• Disregards common law in each of the fifty states that can address these
issues.28
Local governments derive all of their powers from their states.29 Thus, states
have the residual power to preempt the enactment of non-sustainable laws and
practices by their local communities regarding climate change and infrastructure.30
However, the Supreme Court recently deferred to local zoning by-laws to determine
what can and cannot be developed on land in each town and city. 31 The Biden
Administration 2021 infrastructure law and 2022 Inflation Reduction Act do not
address these barriers to implementing sustainable renewable power. After
analyzing this reality, this Article develops alternatives within the structure of
existing U.S. law.32
With plentiful sustainable renewable technologies available now at competitive
costs, 33 how the courts interpret the separation of powers of different levels of
government will determine whether the U.S. and the world successfully control the
rapidly warming climate. Part I examines sustainable technology infrastructure: its
recent competitive advantages, declining costs, and critical role in reducing climate
change. Yet, new, taller wind turbines on elevated ridge lines—where maximum
wind power can be captured—require more land per unit of energy produced than
other energy sources; this can trigger local zoning laws.
Part II analyzes the constitutional maze within the separation of U.S. legal
power. Part II.A analyzes the cascade of Supreme Court precedents incapacitating
federal government preemption of local siting of renewable infrastructure. Part II.A
also examines recent unsuccessful federal attempts to preempt lower-level local
jurisdiction on energy siting. Part II.B deconstructs court precedents affording
deference to local zoning. Part II.C takes the final step analyzing why long26

See infra Part IV.D.1.
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); see also Paul L. Joskow, Facilitating
Transmission Expansion to Support Efficient Decarbonization of the Electricity Sector 13–
15 (MIT Ctr. for Energy & Env’t Pol’y Rsch., Working Paper No. 2021-009, 2021),
https://ceepr.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2021-009.pdf [https://perma.cc/893A9RRN] (noting that energy-related interstate commerce includes all of the continental U.S.
with the exception of parts of Texas).
28
See infra Part IV.D.
29
STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 185, 522
(8th ed. 2019) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
30
See infra Part III.C.
31
See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
32
See infra Part IV.
33
See infra Part I.C.
27
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recognized implied ‘conflict preemption’ has not been applied successfully by courts
to enjoin inferior-level local municipal regulation blocking use of local land to site
sustainable power.
For almost a century since the enactment of the Federal Power Act, U.S. law
has divided legal power over electricity. Part III.A examines controversial, unique
constitutional precedents segregating federal, state, and local legal authority
regarding U.S. electric infrastructure. Part III.B analyzes recent Supreme Court
decisions deferring to inferior-level local control regarding land use for new energy
infrastructure. Given the role of state law, Part III.C undertakes a detailed analysis
of each of the fifty states’ preemptive powers over their local municipalities’ landuse siting power for electric infrastructure:
• In twenty-two states, there is no state power generation siting authority;
rather, local zoning controls;
• Independent “merchant” power generation facilities, which in recent years
have dominated new wind power facility development in the U.S., are not
included within the exercise of state siting authority in twelve more of these
states;34
• Five states that regulate energy projects also require that they separately
obtain local zoning and land-use approvals, which provides local
government an effective “veto” over states;
• Twenty states exercising state energy siting authority exercise jurisdiction
only over large power facility projects that do not include typically smaller
wind turbine projects;
• Only four of the fifty states exercise any effective preemptive power on
energy infrastructure, notwithstanding that many other states have 100%
sustainable clean energy goals as state legal policy.35
This Article’s analysis concludes and demonstrates that rather than more than
half the states exercising power over their cities regarding siting of renewable
energy, in reality, only four of the fifty states exercise state power preemptively over

34

Compare IND. CODE § 8-1-8.5-7 (exempting construction of electric generating
facilities primarily for that person’s own use), with MO. REV. STAT. § 386.020(15) (noting
exemptions including electricity generated for railroads, and private use of private land).
35
See Table of 100% Clean Energy States, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALL.,
https://www.cesa.org/projects/100-clean-energy-collaborative/table-of-100-clean-energystates/ [https://perma.cc/5VW8-WQDD] (last visited Aug. 3, 2022) (showing 15 of the 17
states that are members of the Clean Energy States Alliance do not effectively preempt local
‘aesthetic’ zoning which can frustrate wind project infrastructure in their states).
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35,000 local U.S. municipalities.36 This void in the remaining forty-six states creates
a fundamental conflict and friction between traditional local land-use ‘police power’
juxtaposed against national imperatives immediately on an expedited basis to control
climate change. This void in forty-six states—potentially frustrating national climate
policy—begs for innovative and creative legal solutions.
Part IV identifies and analyzes six innovative legal solutions, without changing
current U.S. law, to circumvent local zoning that is zoning-out sustainable renewable
power. All six options can be implemented within the accelerated time frame set by
the Biden Administration:37
• Two of these six solutions re-locate wind facilities to not be within any
municipal jurisdiction to avoid barriers created by inferior-level local
zoning law;
• Two have the twenty-eight states that have state energy siting laws re-focus
how they apply that law and introduce special permits to supersede local
‘aesthetic’ zoning;
• Two reactivate and utilize common law mechanisms in lieu of local
restrictive ‘aesthetic’ zoning to address any nuisances or injuries related to
sustainable infrastructure.
Without utilizing these six innovative ‘workarounds’ presented in Part IV, local
and state governments legally retain all power under the Tenth Amendment not
expressly granted to the federal government in the Constitution. 38 This Article
analyzes this reserved power of 35,000 cities and towns to control and frustrate
national policy on climate change. 39 It identifies several alternative mechanisms
under existing U.S. law to successfully navigate these otherwise intractable legal
bottlenecks. Each of these strategic legal paths circumvents existing local barricades
to site sufficient amounts of necessary sustainable energy infrastructure within the
tight time frames of the accelerated Biden Administration pledges regarding the
climate.40

36

Id.; see also infra Part IV.C.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
38
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
39
See infra Part III.A–B.
40
See infra Part IV.D.1.
37
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I. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SITING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
“Climate change is the most complex problem in history. We won’t solve
it with technology alone, but we also can’t solve it without technology.”41
—Derek Thompson
A. Climate Change, Changing Generation Technologies
The Paris Agreement is the international legal commitment to mitigate climate
change.42 The U.S. is distinguished as one of the world’s two largest emitters of
GHGs, second only to China, as shown in Figure 1.43 In response to climate change,
the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) in December 2015, with 186
nations of the 197 world nations attending, agreed to do everything necessary to hold
“the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above preindustrial levels” and “[to pursue] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C
above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks
and impacts of climate change.” 44 The Paris Agreement requires nations to set

41

Derek Thompson, The Atlantic Daily: Three Reasons to be Optimistic About the
2020s, ATLANTIC (Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2021/
12/derek-thompson-ai-mrna-green-energy/621131/ [https://perma.cc/YBL2-CU2A].
42
See The Paris Agreement, supra note 18 (“The Paris Agreement is a legally binding
international treaty on climate change adopted by 196 Parties at COP 21 in Paris, on 12
December 2015 and entered into force on 4 November 2016. Its goal is to limit global
warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial
levels.”).
43
Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U. S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 25,
2022),
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data
[https://perma.cc/UM82-5HQC] (“In 2014, the top carbon dioxide (CO2) emitters were
China, the United States, the European Union, India, the Russian Federation, and Japan.
These data include CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, as well as cement
manufacturing and gas flaring. Together, these sources represent a large proportion of total
global CO2 emissions.”).
44
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (at art. 2(1)(a)), https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/16-1104-Environment-and-Conservation-Multilateral-Paris-Agree
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P98-TYDR].
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annual, nationally determined contributions for greenhouse gas emission
standards.45
Most recently, in 2021, the COP26 held in Glasgow did not achieve the pledges
necessary to arrest rapid climate change, according to the leader of the United
Nations. 46 Instead, COP26 agreed on several softer and less enforceable general
agreements among all countries to report progress annually and that smaller groups
of countries would either shift away from the use of coal, control methane emissions,
halt and reverse deforestation, or any combination of the three options.47
One of the problems plaguing international climate agreements has been
transparency and verification. Many nations under-report their GHG emissions and
exaggerate their mitigating actions, which results in exaggerated data “equivalent to
between the amount of emissions produced in a year by a major industrialized nation
(8.5 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases) and on the upper end almost a quarter
of humanity’s total annual contribution to the climate crisis (13.3 billion metric
tons).”48 Notwithstanding inaccurate claims, even if all announced country pledges
were fully realized on time, the world would end up with at least a 2.1°C warmer
world climate by the end of the century according to the International Energy
Agency.49

45

The Paris Agreement, supra note 18 (noting that the nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) are gradually progressive, meaning states are supposed to lower their
greenhouse gas emissions progressively and continually from each year to the following
year).
46
Laura Quiñones, COP26 Closes with ‘Compromise’ Deal on Climate, but It’s Not
Enough, Says UN Chief, UN NEWS (Nov. 13, 2021), https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/11
05792 [https://perma.cc/SB74-ZEAL].
47
Id.
48
Report Exposes the Shaky Data Undermining the World’s Progress on Climate Change,
GRIST (Nov. 8, 2021), https://grist.org/cop26/report-exposes-the-shaky-data-undermining-theworlds-progress-on-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/P6R6-5FZZ]. A significant amount of
under-reporting was due to over-reporting CO2-absorbing contributions of local forests and
systemic under-reporting of methane and fluorinated gas emission, each of which is a more
powerful warming emission than CO2. Id. Regarding methane emissions, see Steven Ferrey,
The Second Element, First Priority, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 41 (2018); see also Steven
Ferrey, Unforced Errors, Legal Fulcrum & International Climate, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 115 (2018); see generally World Energy Outlook 2021, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY
(2021).
49
World Energy Outlook 2021, supra note 48.
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Figure 150

The electric power generation sector is among the most significant contributing
source of GHG emissions in the U.S.51 More than 99% of GHG emissions in the
power sector emanate from burning fossil fuels. 52 The electric power sector
responsible for this dominant percentage of GHGs is a key target for legal policy
and inevitably must reduce a disproportionate percentage of national emissions.53

50

Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions
[https://perma.cc/9GN2-TQMC] (last updated Jan. 14, 2022).
51
See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions
/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/X3TZ-58E3] (last updated Aug. 5,
2022) (showing electric power generation as accounting for 25% of U.S. GHG emissions in
2020, second only to transportation).
52
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW, TRANSFORMING THE
NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: THE SECOND INSTALLMENT OF THE QER 3-5 (2017).
53
AMERICA’S PLEDGE INITIATIVE ON CLIMATE, FULFILLING AMERICA’S PLEDGE: HOW
STATES, CITIES, AND BUSINESSES ARE LEADING THE UNITED STATES TO A LOW-CARBON
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If dramatic changes to site and deploy sustainable generation technologies are
not achieved, at current rates of energy development, energy-related CO2 emissions
in 2050 would be 137% of recent levels under the existing pattern of power
development and expansion, instead of dramatically lowered, as required by
international agreements. 54 Renewable technologies that dramatically mitigate
carbon emissions exist and are commonly used.55 Renewable power can generate
power at a lower cost than conventional power generation.56 Renewable energy also
improves local health by emitting fewer or no criteria air pollutants57 compared to
conventional fossil fuel electric power generation.58
FUTURE 19–25 (2018), https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2018/09/Fulfilling-AmericasPledge-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8JQ-SMMW] (noting several strategies to significantly
reduce GHG emissions from the power sector); Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra
note 51 (noting strategies to reduce GHG emissions from the power sector).
54
William C. Ramsey, Deputy Exec. Dir., Int’l Energy Agency, Press Conference at
OECD Tokyo Center: Energy Technology Perspectives: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050
(July 14, 2006), http://www.unece.lsu.edu/biofuels/documents/2007July/SRN_020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26WU-FCP3] (explaining the direct correlation between traditional energy
use and climate warming emissions which has the effect of increasing global GHG
emissions); Holli Riebeek, Global Warming, NASA: EARTH OBSERVATORY (June 3, 2010),
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/GlobalWarming [https://perma.cc/74DU-KXHS];
Energy and the Environment Explained: Outlook for Future Emissions, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-forfuture-emissions.php [https://perma.cc/GVD3-SGJ6] (last updated April 12, 2022) (“In the
Annual Energy Outlook 2022 . . . Reference case, which assumes no changes to current laws
or regulations, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that U.S. energyrelated carbon dioxide . . . emissions will fall to . . . 4.7 billion metric tons in 2050, or 2%
below 2021 levels.”).
55
Andrea Vittorio, Countries Could Double Global Share of Renewable Energy by
2030, Agency Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 22, 2014, 10:00 PM), https://news.bloombergenvir
onment.com/environment-and-energy/countries-could-double-global-share-of-renewableenergy-by-2030-agency-says [https://perma.cc/M6BE-ZHFE].
56
Wind projects in the U.S. cost, on average, $45/MWh for capacity and energy without
other subsidies, and $58/MWh for solar. See Jim Efstathiou Jr. & Brian K. Sullivan, Smarter
Wind Turbines Try to Squeeze More Power on Each Rotation, BLOOMBERG L. (May 9, 2018,
6:25 AM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/smarterwind-turbines-try-to-squeeze-more-power-on-each-rotation
[https://perma.cc/44CVTUPH].
57
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 205 tbl.5.2 (detailing the six criteria of air
pollutants).
58
STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX: KEY CHOICES FOR
CARBON RESTRICTION AND SEQUESTRATION 30–31 (2010); Michaja Pehl, Anders Arvesen,
Florian Humpenöder, Alexander Popp, Edgar G. Hertwich & Gunnar Luderer,
Understanding Future Emissions from Low-Carbon Power Systems by Integration of LifeCycle Assessment and Integrated Energy Modeling, 2 NATURE ENERGY 939–945 (2017)
(explaining that lifecycle carbon emissions of solar and wind power generation are many
times less than power generation from coal or natural gas, even if they employ carbon capture
and storage).
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B. Ascending Wind Power Generation
Wind power is a story of old and new refinements of a millennia-old
technology. The fundamental principle of harnessing wind power has been similar
for two millennia.59 No later than 200 B.C., simple horizontal windmills were used
to pump water in China, the Middle East, and Persia; vertical-axis windmills with
sails made from woven reeds were used to grind grain.60 In Egypt, wind power was
harnessed to move boats in the Nile River as early as 5000 B.C.61 The first wind
turbines appeared in Denmark in 1890.62
Wind and natural gas generation have recently dominated new sources of
electric energy deployed in the U.S.63 In 2012, wind energy in the U.S. was the most
installed new electricity generation source, at 43% of all new annual electric
generation.64 In 2015, more than half of new generating capacity was wind energy.65
U.S. total annual electricity generation from wind in the U.S. increased from about
6 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 2000 to approximately 300 billion kWh in 2019,
constituting about 7.3% of total U.S. utility-scale electricity generation.66 In 2019,
electricity generation from wind surpassed renewable hydropower, previously the

59

See Wind Explained: History of Wind Power, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/wind/history-of-wind-power.php [https://perma.cc/8S
XD-J3LC] (last updated Mar. 30, 2022).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.; Energy Dept. Reports: U.S. Wind Energy Production and Manufacturing
Reaches Record Highs, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.energy.gov/art
icles/energy-dept-reports-us-wind-energy-production-and-manufacturing-reaches-recordhighs [https://perma.cc/RJ76-727U]; see also Suparna Ray, New Electric Generating
Capacity in 2020 Will Come Primarily from Wind and Solar, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42495#:~:text=New%20
electric%20generating%20capacity%20in%202020%20will%20come%20primarily%20fro
m%20wind%20and%20solar,-Source%3A%20U.S.%20Energy&text=According%20to%2
0the%20U.S.%20Energy,start%20commercial%20operation%20in%202020 [https://perma
.cc/X8AN-W9B2].
64
Energy Dept. Reports, supra note 63.
65
See Tim Shear, Scheduled 2015 Capacity Additions Mostly Wind and Natural Gas;
Retirements Mostly Coal, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=20292 [https://perma.cc/9FWB-TV7W].
66
Wind Explained: Electricity Generation from Wind, supra note 25 (“Utility scale
includes facilities with at least one megawatt (1,000 kilowatts) of electricity generation
capacity.”).
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dominant renewable power resource in the U.S. and is now the most-used source of
renewable energy for electricity generation on an annual basis in the country.67
Renewable energy sources are forecast to overtake natural gas as the dominant
source of electricity generation in the U.S. in 2031, even without the continuation of
current federal tax subsidies, as wind and solar generation costs plunge.68 In 2017,
renewable energy and increased energy efficiency were the primary sources of the
4.2% decrease in power sector carbon emissions.69 Due to wind power additions, the
U.S. now has the second most installed wind generation capacity in the world.70
C. Wind Cost Decreases, Maximizing Efficiency as Turbine Size Increases, but
Increasing Local Resistance to Wind Siting
Cost matters. The capital cost of wind power projects has decreased to be
competitive with the cost of more traditional fossil fuel resources for electricity
generation.71 Wind projects in the U.S. generate electricity at an average cost of $45
per megawatt-hour (MWh) for capacity and energy without other subsidies,72 and

67

Mickey Francis, U.S. Renewable Energy Consumption Surpasses Coal for the First
Time in over 130 Years, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 28, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43895 [https://perma.cc/9V29-JWD9].
68
Naureen S. Malik, Renewables Will Top Gas in 2031 as Largest Energy Source,
BLOOMBERG
L.
NEWS
(June
12,
2016,
10:00
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-13/renewables-will-top-gas-as-biggestu-s-power-producer-in-2031#xj4y7vzkg [https://perma.cc/WWY8-VEB7].
69
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE & THE BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY IN AMERICA: 2018 FACTBOOK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, 4
(2018),
http://www.bcse.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-Sustainable-Energy-in-AmericaFactbook_Executive-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT9B-5HF5].
70
Onshore Wind Net Capacity Additions by Country or Region, 2015–2022, INT’L
ENERGY AGENCY (Nov. 8, 2020), https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/onshorewind-net-capacity-additions-by-country-or-region-2015-2022
[https://perma.cc/C59ABMLQ].
71
Tara Patel, Fossil Fuels Losing Cost Advantage over Solar, Wind, IEA Says,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Aug. 31, 2015, 6:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic
les/2015-08-31/solar-wind-power-costs-drop-as-fossil-fuels-increase-iea-says#xj4y7vzkg
[https://perma.cc/U4Z9-6PR7]; see also Wind Energy Technologies Office, Advantages and
Challenges of Wind Energy, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/adv
antages-and-challenges-wind-energy [https://perma.cc/X5AJ-4YBU] (last visited Aug. 7,
2022).
72
Jim Efstathiou Jr. & Brian K. Sullivan, Smarter Wind Turbines Try to Squeeze More
Power on Each Rotation, BLOOMBERG L., (MAY 9, 2018, 6:25 AM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/bloomberg-law-news/X
4P6I7CG000000?bc=W1siU2VhcmNoICYgQnJvd3NlIiwiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmxvb21
iZXJnbGF3LmNvbS9wcm9kdWN0L2JsYXcvc2VhcmNoL3Jlc3VsdHMvM2Q3ZmExMG
QyZWZhNmJlYTdjNGQ3ZDQ4MjdhMzc0Y2EiXV0--9308749b6df9ae7ce6911a01902ee
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some large wind power projects can produce power at a very low cost of $1020/MWh.73 Between 2008 and 2015, the average cost of building capacity for landbased wind power in the U.S. decreased by 41%.74 In a recent study, unsubsidized
wind power and utility-scale solar projects came in at lower price ranges than any
other analyzed resource, including gas, coal, and nuclear power; “[u]nsubsidized
wind ranges from $28–$54 per megawatt-hour . . . . [while] [f]actoring in subsidies,
wind prices plunge to $11–$45/MWh.” 75 Wind power is forecast by the U.S.
Department of Energy to be cheaper than electricity produced from natural gas by
2025, even without a continuing federal production tax credit incentive.76

9583ee90a74&criteria_id=3d7fa10d2efa6bea7c4d7d4827a374ca&search32=C2qlz6a6OCf
y-gU4kSoadw%3D%3DMb5GPGpsCSwGxrVPGLvDX-2ieteKD996o2_umrMgo0FAnVb
Ch2wRSL5lPdlBUt3GPE8VejQg9vU1KOibc28G5QovzajrvkGlgoxxdPfRvIQViZmuLHhI
5y9Tcy2i2Pa3M_T3pbwhJKAgbFLTVYNI78no9jPFGKK4I4mMQccJRcsKDslRVyu-wV
5t7Y9axUi2 [https://perma.cc/4A6Z-JBJ7].
73
Advantages and Challenges of Wind Energy, supra note 71.
74
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REVOLUTION . . . NOW: THE FUTURE ARRIVES FOR FIVE
CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES – 2016 UPDATE 1 (2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/de
fault/files/2017/05/f34/Revolution%20Now%202016%20Report_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E
74C-7YAE]; see also Simon Mueller, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, NEXT GENERATION WIND
AND SOLAR POWER: FROM COST TO VALUE 10 (2016), https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/
assets/2df1e0cf-aea3-4627-a328-f1a49cc88864/Next_Generation_Windand_Solar_Power
From_Cost_to_ValueFull_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/92P4-6W2B]; MARK BOLINGER &
JOACHIM SEEL, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB’Y, UTILITY-SCALE SOLAR 2015: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PROJECT COST, PERFORMANCE, AND PRICING TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2016), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lbnl1006037_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4YT-AFHT]; Silvio Marcacci, Renewable Energy
Prices Hit Record Lows: How Can Utilities Benefit from Unstoppable Solar and Wind?,
FORBES (Jan. 21, 2020, 7:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2020/01
/21/renewable-energy-prices-hit-record-lows-how-can-utilities-benefit-from-unstoppablesolar-and-wind/?sh=577034ff2c84 [https://perma.cc/B4C4-45KW] (“NREL predicts the
LCOE of wind technologies will decline at least another 64% by 2050 in its optimistic
scenario and at least 44% in its mid-level scenario. In those same scenarios, solar’s LCOE
falls by 74% and 47% by 2050.”).
75
Marcacci, supra note 74 (comparing wind prices to solar, gas, coal, and nuclear).
76
See Christopher Martin & Justin Doom, Wind Power Without U.S. Subsidy to Become
Cheaper than Gas, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015, 7:43 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-12/wind-energy-without-subsidy-willbe-cheaper-than-gas-in-a-decade#xj4y7vzkg [https://perma.cc/E5BH-QQ38]; see also
Richard Bowers, U.S. Wind Energy Production Tax Credit Extended Through 2021, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
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However, there is another aspect. Some of this continuing decrease in the cost
per unit of wind power generated results from exponentially increased kinetic power
capture with increasing turbine height which permits a larger diameter turbine rotor
blade to be used. “For example, the typical turbine’s generating capacity, blade
length, and elevation of the mast have increased rapidly over time, making wind
speeds at higher elevations more accessible and improving wind generation capacity
factors and reducing generating costs.”77 As the blade lengthens, the swept area of
the turbine blade creates added power generation by the square of that change in the
length of the blade.78 Taller wind turbines capture stronger winds with speed not
impaired by trees on the land or offshore in water, as shown over time in Figure 2;
the amount of power produced increases at the rate of the cube of the wind speed
hitting the blades.79

46576 [https://perma.cc/82AH-THH8] (“The U.S. production tax credit (PTC), a perkilowatthour (kWh) credit for electricity generated by eligible renewable sources, was first
enacted in 1992 and has been extended and modified in the years since. At the end of
December 2020, Congress extended the PTC at 60% of the full credit amount, or $0.018 per
kWh ($18 per megawatthour), for another year through December 31, 2021.”).
77
Joskow, supra note 27, at 6.
78
STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 2:12.20 (2022) [hereinafter
THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER]; see also Utility-Scale Wind Energy, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, https://windexchange.energy.gov/markets/utility-scale [https://perma.cc/4ES8CKSZ] (last visited Aug. 1, 2022) (showing a diagram of increased wind velocity with a
higher wind turbine with larger blades).
79
THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 78, at § 2:12:20.
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Figure 2: Taller Wind Turbines, Blade Length, and Power Generation
Capacity over Time80

Therefore, a modest increase of 10% for a 100-foot blade to 110 feet achieves
a ten-squared 100% increase in power. Similarly, a location higher on a ridge line
capturing only a 10% greater wind speed at that greater height, such as capturing a
wind speed averaging 16.5 mph instead of 15 mph, exponentially cubes the power
output by 1000%. Together, a taller turbine mast which captures a 10% increase in
wind speed at a greater height, coupled with a 10% longer blade, results in a 1,100%
increase in effective electric power generation.
As noted by one observer, “the typical turbine’s generating capacity, blade
length, and elevation have increased rapidly over time, making wind speeds at higher
elevations more accessible, and this creates opportunities to improve wind
generation capacity factors and to reduce generating costs.”81 Thus, larger, more
visible wind turbines can create substantially more sustainable power generation,
although added height and blade span also have a more scenic visual impact. And
here lies the confrontation with local ‘aesthetic’ overlay zoning.

80
Wind Turbines: the Bigger, the Better, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Aug. 16, 2022),
https://www.energy.gov/eere/articles/wind-turbines-bigger-better [https://perma.cc/KV572A6Z].
81
Joskow, supra note 27, at 6.
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D. Scaling Wind Against Land Use
Wind power requires a lot of land. Wind power is much less dense than fossilfuel or nuclear energy sources.82 To site wind turbines requires four times more land
area than a gas-fired fossil-fuel-fired power plant that would generate similar
kilowatt-hour amounts of power.83 The U.S., based on current wind power operating
experience and technology, would require approximately 460,000 onshore wind
turbines—seven times the current installed wind turbine base to produce 50% of the
U.S. electricity supply.84
Wind power turbines, often sited on mountain ridgelines to harness the
strongest winds, can obstruct view sheds.85 Wind power requires more U.S. land
82

See Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENV’T L. J. 241, 243
n.7 (2011) (citing Robert I. McDonald, Joseph Fargione, Joe Kiesecker, William M. Miller
& Jimmie Powell, Energy Sprawl or Energy Efficiency: Climate Policy Impacts on Natural
Habitat for the United States of America, 4 PLOS ONE 1, 4 fig.3 (Aug. 2009)).
83
See Samantha Gross, Renewables, Land Use, and Local Opposition in the United
States, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020
/01/FP_20200113_renewables_land_use_local_opposition_gross.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2B
4-AUCJ]; see also Dustin Solberg, Wind’s Big Footprint: Clean Energy Still Needs
Safeguards for Nature, COOL GREEN SCI. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://blog.nature.org/science/20
17/11/29/winds-big-footprint-clean-energy-still-needs-safeguards-for-nature/ [https://perma
.cc/5PVD-ARPJ] (“For the energy they produce, wind turbines have a disproportionately
large footprint on the land. At 72.1 square kilometers per terawatt, wind’s footprint is bigger
than natural gas, or coal or petroleum (at 18.6, 9.7 and 44.7, respectively).”).
84
Gabrielle Collins & Michelle Michot Foss, The Global Energy Transition’s Looming
Valley of Death, RICE UNIV. BAKER INST. (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/
research/global-energy-transitions-looming-valley-death [https://perma.cc/XUK4-74MH].
85
See Wind Explained: Where Wind Power Is Harnessed, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Mar. 30, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/wind/where-wind-power-isharnessed.php [https://perma.cc/X8AN-W9B2] (noting that favorable places for wind
turbines are where the annual average wind speed is at least 9 miles per hour (mph) for small
wind turbines and 13 mph for utility-scale turbines, and that wind speeds are slower close to
the Earth’s surface and faster at higher altitudes, with the average hub height of modern wind
turbines at 88 meters); see also Alexander Kalmikov, Wind Power Fundamentals, in WIND
ENERGY ENGINEERING 17–24 (Trevor M. Letcher ed., 2017) (explaining the mathematics
behind wind power); RYAN WISER & MARK BOLINGER, U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, 2018 WIND
TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT (2019), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/08/
f65/2018%20Wind%20Technologies%20Market%20Report%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma
.cc/P3ZR-XC56]; Wind Energy Factsheet, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SYS. UNIV. OF MICH.,
https://css.umich.edu/factsheets/wind-energy-factsheet
[https://perma.cc/Z83S-EALW]
(last visited Aug. 2, 2022) (explaining that wind speed typically increases with altitude and
increases over open areas without windbreaks such as trees or buildings. Favorable sites for
wind turbines include the tops of smooth, rounded hills; open plains and water; and mountain
gaps that funnel and intensify wind); Sarah Hoff and Jonathan DeVilbiss, Wind Turbine
Heights and Capacities Have Increased over the Past Decade, ENERGY INFO. AGENCY (Nov.
29, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33912 [https://perma.cc/YN5
Q-8JPQ]; infra Part II.A.1.
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because capacity wind generation factors range from 0.26 to 0.52, with a fleetwide
average capacity factor of 0.35.86 This U.S. factor compares to a wind capacity factor
of 0.21 to 0.279 in the United Kingdom.87 Intermittent wind power generation with
low average capacity factors needs additional land to produce sufficient power.88
Such intermittent capacity at uncontrollable times does not contribute significantly
to power system reliability.89
All of the forces of international and national climate imperatives, a U.S.
market economy, public perception, and one constant factor, land, are interacting in
an interesting mix. As the need for non-carbon-emitting renewable wind power has
increased to address climate change, its costs have decreased, making it costeffective. However, this has been achieved by capturing the exponential efficiency
and cost advantages of wind turbines being designed as larger and taller, thereby
becoming more visible and affecting more people on more land. A key variable is
that wind generation is dramatically more land-intensive than conventional fossilfuel-fired power generation. And as the next Parts set forth, the use of land for wind
power is a local, not international or national, area of legal discretion, and there is
local resistance to local wind power.
II. SITING SUSTAINABLE WIND POWER INFRASTRUCTURE: LOCAL POLICE POWER
AND STATE ENERGY SITING LAW
Notwithstanding numerous federal and state incentives for developing wind
energy projects,90 the needle to thread for wind generation involves the significant
amounts of land required to generate a megawatt of wind power.91 When land is

86

Wind Energy Factsheet, supra note 85; see generally Richard Bowers & Owen
Comstock, 2020 Could Be a Record Year for U.S. Wind Turbine Installations, ENERGY INFO.
AGENCY (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45856
[https://perma.cc/KQ3H-Z8T3].
87
Wind Energy Factsheet, supra note 85.
88
THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 78, at § 2:6 tbl. 2.1.
89
Id. § 2:12.20.
90
Id. §§ 3:59.10, 3:59.40, 10:114–10:115.30.
91
See Dave Merrill, The U.S. Will Need a Lot of Land for a Zero-Carbon Economy,
BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-energy-land-useeconomy/?leadSource=uverify%20wall [https://perma.cc/6FEQ-7K6S]; see generally JIM
GREEN & MICK SAGRILLO, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, ZONING FOR DISTRIBUTED
WIND POWER – BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS (Aug. 2005), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy05osti
/38167.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG4D-U8U2] (discussing zoning and how changes are
necessary for more space to allow for wind turbines). For a listing of various incentives for
renewable energy, see DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org [https://perma.cc/5265-Y4WX] (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
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required, local governments are positioned to create a formidable barrier to locating
wind projects across the U.S. This Part examines: (A) the use of local ‘aesthetic’
zoning to bar siting of renewable energy projects; (B) courts’ deference to
municipalities on ‘aesthetic’ zoning; and (C) the deferential outcomes of challenges
to such zoning in courts.
A. Local Implementation of ‘Aesthetic’ Zoning to Bar Sustainable Power
1. Environmental Overlay Zones
Overlay zones impose protective limitations and restrictions on a land area,
notwithstanding the area’s basic physical zoning district, in order to protect
environmentally sensitive areas. Overlay districts are superimposed and overlaid on
existing zones. 92 Overlay districts can attempt to protect specific environmental
features such as fresh water supply,93 wetlands,94 coastal protection,95 or agricultural
production capabilities.96 Notably, most of these environmental features and values

92

See Property Topics and Concepts, AMER. PLANNING ASS’N, https://www.planning.
org/divisions/planningandlaw/propertytopics.htm [https://perma.cc/3XCF-JSCY] (last
visited Aug. 3, 2022).
93
Local communities may also identify and protect through zoning ordinances,
wellhead and sole source aquifers. A wellhead protection area is “surface and subsurface
area surrounding a water well or wellfield, supplying a public water system, through
which contaminants are reasonably likely to move toward and reach such water well
. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(e). Identifying critical aquifer protection areas requires
considering “[t]he vulnerability of the aquifer to contamination . . . . The number of persons
or the proportion of population using the ground water as a drinking water source . . . [and]
The economic, social and environmental benefits [and] . . . costs . . . that would result to the
area from maintenance of ground water of high quality.” 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6(d).
94
Wetlands include swamps, marshes, bogs, and bottom lands and are usually found
along rivers, lakes, and coastal waters. LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
OF LAND USE § 4:2, at 4-3 (1990). The wetlands zone may include fresh water and tidal
wetlands. Id. §§ 4:29–4:30, at 4-133 to 4-138. They are habitats for a vast amount of wildlife
and plant life and serve a role in water quality improvement. Id. § 4:2, at 4-4. The most
common purposes of local regulation of wetlands “are control of surface water pollution,
preservation of groundwater quantity and quality, flood protection, protection of
fisheries, shellfish and wildlife habitats, recreation and aesthetics.” Id. § 4:29, at 4-134.
95
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 536.
96
States and local governments have adopted and implemented many regulations
designed to protect agriculture and farmland. See generally MALONE, supra note 94, at 6-1
to 6-104. Through the use of zoning and right-to-farm laws, the preservation of farmland
can be an obstacle for a potential project developer. Id. § 6:1, at 6-3. There are two general
types of relevant zoning: nonexclusive agricultural zoning and exclusive agricultural zoning.
Id. § 6:26–6:36, at 6-55 to 6-69.
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are not necessarily negatively impacted by the judicious location of modern wind
turbines in or proximate to the overlay zone.97
One feature of modern wind turbines is their height, as shown in Figure 2. A
well-established line of precedent allows local zoning ordinances to block tall
structures.98 A town could use—and towns have used—overlay districts to attempt
to prohibit wind power turbines. A town may define overlay districts for aesthetic
character or scenic vistas, designed to protect the aesthetics and character of hilltops
and ridgeline open-space views.99 These higher hills and ridgelines make taller wind
power turbines most productive in many eastern U.S. land regions. 100 Such an
overlay zone may restrict or prohibit siting wind power turbines by expressly
prohibiting wind towers in the overlay districts or by limiting structural height.
2. Municipal ‘Aesthetic’ Zoning-Out of Sustainable Wind Power Turbines
Several cities and towns in the U.S. have enacted Ridgeline and Hilltop Overlay
Districts to protect hills and other elevated land areas from any aesthetic impacts of

97

Surface land-mounted wind turbines would not disturb most groundwater supply.
Many wind turbines are located on farms in the Midwest and plains states without reports of
deleterious impact on agricultural activities. Some coastal locations enjoy greater wind
velocity and have hosted for decades large nuclear and fossil-fuel-fired power generation
that utilize ocean water for cooling. By judicious siting on uplands, wetlands impacts can be
minimized. See generally Environmental Impacts and Siting of Wind Projects, U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/environmental-impacts-and-siting-windprojects [https://perma.cc/TN6K-SQBA] (last visited Aug. 3, 2022); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
THE INTERIOR, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON WIND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT ON BLM-ADMINISTERED LANDS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 5-10 to 513 (June 2005), https://windeis.anl.gov/documents/fpeis/maintext/Vol1/Vol1Complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FG3M-7RZG].
98
Dowdell v. Bloomquist, 847 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I. 2004) (enjoining tree planting and
holding that a row of trees was a “fence”); MJD Props., LLC v. Haley, 358 P.3d 476, 482
(Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a single tree artificially located and planted may
constitute a structure); Tranfield v. Arcuni-English, 215 A.3d 222, 224–26 (enjoining
neighbor who planted approximately twenty-four arborvitaes that were ten to twelve feet
tall).
99
See infra Part II.A.2; see also infra note 136.
100
See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. As noted above, the amount of wind
power captured is a function of the square value of the swept blade area of the wind turbine
which is fostered by taller, more visible turbine masts going higher to allow longer blades
sweeping a wider area; wind power captured also is a function of the cubed value of the wind
speed which is greater on ridgelines as the wind hits the ridgeline and compresses at greater
speed, a priori.
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wind turbine projects.101 In North Carolina, the Mountain Ridge Protection Act of
1983 allows counties to prohibit any ridge-top placement of wind turbines that have
a total capacity of 3 megawatts (MW) or greater; this would exclude a single large
on-shore wind turbine shown in Figure 2, or several smaller wind turbines sited at
the same facility, or very modest turbine heights on taller hills or mountains. 102
Watauga County, North Carolina, was the first local government to adopt a
restrictive wind energy system ordinance.103
Likewise, county boards of Commissioners in Kansas can enact ordinances
restricting or banning the aesthetic impacts of the development of large-scale wind
facilities. 104 Controversy erupted in communities along the Connecticut River
Valley, where developers proposed wind turbines on hilltops and ridgelines
traversing local communities. 105 Towns enacted ridgeline and hilltop overlay
districts to prohibit wind towers and turbines and to address concerns that
commercial wind turbines would degrade view-sheds of uplands around the town.106
Hampden, Massachusetts, enacted Aesthetic Ridgeline Overlay Districts as part
of the town’s zoning master plan and zoning by-laws.107 Wilbraham, Massachusetts,
enacted ridgeline overlay districts barring “windmills” from obstructing the view
from public ways or any development that “interfere[s] with or degrades [the ridge
line’s] scenic attractiveness as viewed from either a public highway or Public
Vantage Point.” 108 Once a wind project was proposed in its boundaries, Kirby,

101

For example, Hampden and Wilbraham, Massachusetts, which are located along
ridgelines of central Massachusetts, have enacted Ridgeline and Hilltops Overlay districts.
See infra notes 107–108.
102
Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-205, -206, -209 (prohibiting the construction of
buildings or structures with a height of more than 40 feet on mountains of 3,000 feet above
sea level that stand 500 feet above the adjacent valley floor).
103
Monte Mitchell, Watauga to Allow Windmills; Commissioners Adopt Rules for
Single Systems; Process Stricter for Commercial Use, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Aug. 8, 2006).
104
See Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 218 P.3d 404, 417 (2009); Housley Carr,
Kansas Supreme Court Backs County Ban on Wind Farms Based on Aesthetic Reasons,
ELEC. UTIL. WK. (Nov. 9, 2009). Challenges to this were based on a takings argument as
well as a commerce clause challenge. Id.
105
See Frank Juliano, State’s Energy Answer Not Blowing in the Wind, NEWSTIMES
(Dec. 12, 2010), https://www.newstimes.com/local/article/State-s-energy-answer-notblowing-in-the-wind-877284.php [https://perma.cc/4DPP-YCD5].
106
See Mitchell, supra note 103; Carr, supra note 104.
107
HAMPDEN, MASS., ZONING BYLAW § 6.10, https://www.hampdenma.gov/sites/g/file
s/vyhlif656/f/uploads/final_copy_of_zoning_bylaws_10-28-19_-_special_town_meeting.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TAF2-75EF]. The ridgeline district included upland areas with steep
slopes averaging a 15% grade or greater for 200 feet, unique landforms, and any land at an
elevation of 600 or more feet above sea level. Id. § 6.103.
108
WILBRAHAM, MASS., ZONING BYLAW §§ 9.3.4.D, 9.3.8.1, https://mahttps://www.wilbraham-ma.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1887/Zoning-By-Law-2022?bidId
= [https://perma.cc/JMT6-WM68].
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Vermont changed its by-laws to limit large wind generation facilities unless they are
in commercial and light industry municipal zones.109
In Vermont, aesthetic aspects can constitute a nuisance and are a primary
consideration in gaining a certificate of public good necessary to site small landbased wind projects and are employed by courts in resolving related disputes.110 The
Vermont Public Service Board denied a certificate of public good for the 6 MW East
Haven Wind Farm proposed to be sited on an abandoned Air Force radar base
because it would obstruct aesthetic views.111
Various federal district courts hold that a town can enact a temporary ban or
moratorium to block additional wind generation facilities for aesthetic reasons.112 In
New York, a federal district court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the burden
required to challenge a local zoning ordinance entitled to significant court
deference:113 “Plaintiff thus has the heavy burden ‘to negative every conceivable
basis which might support’ the Moratorium.”114 The court declared that aesthetic
considerations were a rational basis for local zoning regulation. 115 Additional
examples of municipal ‘aesthetic’ zoning ordinances and legal challenges are
detailed below. 116 The resilience of local zoning ordinances starts with a
presumption of validity, making a challenge a significant undertaking.117

109

KIRBY, VT. ZONING REGULATIONS art. V, § 5.01, art. XII, § 12.01,
https://www.nvda.net/files/Kirby-Zoning-Regulations-Adopted-8-29-2017.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/6AYK-R675].
110 See
VT. STAT. tit. 30, § 248.
111
Vermont Wind Project Shot Down over Impact on Landscape After Five Years of
Planning, ELEC. UTIL. WK. (Mar. 20, 2006).
112
E.g., Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 157 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“[D]efendants’ subjective motivation in enacting the Moratorium [on constructing new
wind turbines] is irrelevant.” (citing United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 36–37 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring))); Tri Cnty. Paving, Inc. v. Ashe Cnty., 281 F.3d 430, 439 (4th
Cir. 2002); Homar v. Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009, 1029–30 (3d Cir. 1995) (Alito, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 924 (1997).
113
Ecogen, 438 F. Supp. 2d. at 156, 158 (placing the burden on the plaintiff to show
“that the Moratorium [on constructing new wind turbines] . . . bears no rational relationship
to any legitimate governmental purpose” and then holding that the plaintiff failed to meet
that burden).
114
Id. at 158 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
115
Id. (“Aesthetics is generally a valid subject of municipal regulation and concern”
(quoting Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 645 (2d Cir. 1999))); id. (“In New
York, aesthetics can be a valid ground for local zoning decisions.” (quoting Cellular Tel. Co.
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1999))).
116
See infra Part II.C.
117
See infra Part II.B.
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B. Deference to Local Zoning on Aesthetics of Infrastructure Siting
Local governments can regulate local land use pursuant to their traditional
police power.118 The most fundamental tool available to a local government and its
citizens to influence wind power project siting in the community is the local zoning
ordinance and zoning map. Any zoning amendment, even if restrictive of wind
projects, benefits from a presumption of its legal validity for the inferior-level local
agency if it is later challenged in court. Municipal land-use decisions are entitled to
court deference because a “local board of appeals brings to the matter an intimate
understanding of the immediate circumstances, of local conditions, and the
background and purposes of the entire by-law.”119
Zoning amendments are categorized as local legislative actions, passed in many
cases by a supermajority of the local zoning authority.120 Thus, a community not
supportive of wind turbines can enact a highly restrictive amendment to its zoning
ordinance that makes the community unattractive or cost-prohibitive to wind or
other renewable power generation projects of a certain size, certain configuration,
or based on aesthetic or other qualities. Should a prospective wind developer
challenge a restrictive zoning amendment, the legal burden is placed on the wind
developer, as plaintiff, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the zoning
amendment is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of local discretion, and unreasonable,
or substantially unrelated to the public’s health and safety. 121 This is a difficult
standard for any affected developer of a tall, moving wind project to satisfy to
overturn a restrictive zoning law.
A municipality has discretion to adopt a variety of physical lot sizes and
structures and allowed use requirements to restrict development within its borders.
In the category of physical lot characteristics are significant lot line setbacks,
maximum restrictions on the percentage of area of the lot that can be built or used,
a limit on the number of separate structures and/or buildings allowed on each parcel,
and height restrictions—all of which directly affect and restrict modern wind
turbines.122 An important legal determination regarding wind project development
under a local zoning ordinance is whether wind turbine towers are deemed
“structures” under zoning codes. The exercise of local siting power over new

118

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–97 (1926).
Fitzsimonds v. Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 484 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Mass. App. Ct.
1985); see also Manning v. Bos. Redev. Auth., 509 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (Mass. 1987)
(granting “substantial deference” to local administrative agency’s interpretation of local
zoning law).
120
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (“Except as provided herein, no zoning
ordinance or by-law or amendment thereto shall be adopted or changed except by a twothirds vote . . . .”).
121
See McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1022 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2002).
122
See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 519–562.
119
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sustainable wind technology in a municipality can hinge on this definitional
question.
Broad local and state zoning ordinances regulating or preserving aesthetic
characteristics now are deemed constitutionally permissible provided they “have any
reasonable tendency to promote the public morals, health, or safety, or the public
comfort, welfare, or prosperity.” 123 This recognition of aesthetic consideration
evolved in the post-World War II era. Prior to 1954, aesthetic concerns alone were
insufficient to pass constitutional muster, although courts recognized that municipal
zoning laws were available to control through local police power regulation.124 In
1954, with the landmark decision in Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court opened
the door for permissible ‘aesthetic’ zoning regulations:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—
these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional
application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely
illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. . . . The concept of
the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.125
Since zoning is a function of local law, state courts render the majority of
zoning decisions. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that “aesthetics
alone may justify the exercise of the police power; that within the broad concept of
‘general welfare,’ cities and towns may enact reasonable billboard regulations
designed to preserve and improve their physical environment.” 126 The court
acknowledged the “changing community notion that towns and cities can and should
be aesthetically pleasing.” 127 It held that a community may enact local zoning
deemed to produce a “visually satisfying environment” contributing to the welfare
of residents.128
The standard for the constitutionality of local ‘aesthetic’ zoning laws is whether
they are “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the

123

State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, Bldg. Comm’r, 196 N.W. 451, 454–55 (Wis. 1923)
(holding that ‘aesthetic’ zoning must be reasonably related to public health and safety).
124
E.g., Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50, 63 (Md. 1925) (“If any kind or degree of
æsthetic regulation is ever to be within the legitimate powers of government, the principle
controlling it cannot be formulated as yet, and we are not authorized to declare it to be so.”).
125
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
126
John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advert. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 717 (Mass.
1975).
127
Id.
128
Id.
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public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”129 In the aftermath of the Supreme
Court decision in Berman, municipalities began to enact ‘aesthetic’ zoning elements
designed to protect neighborhood character and scenic view sheds, and maintain
property values and effective tax bases.130
C. ‘Aesthetic’ Wind Zoning Challenged in the Courts
Based on the precedents above, a court can uphold a local zoning board’s ruling
that a wind power project would interfere with municipal view sheds and is
prohibited, assuming that the challenged by-law reasonably relates to the protection
of public safety. 131 This zoning discretion of the inferior local municipality
dominates even the superior host states’ subsidy of wind power 132 through
renewable portfolio standard wind subsidies that exist as state law in twenty-nine
U.S. states. 133 If overly broad or not tailored as narrowly as possible, a local

129

Id. (quoting Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 898 (Mass. 1972)
(itself quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926))).
130
Across New England, states vary on whether regulating aesthetics in zoning laws is
constitutional. New Hampshire has made explicit their stance that aesthetics alone are
sufficient to pass constitutional zoning regulations. Asselin v. Town of Conway, 628 A.2d
247, 250 (N.H. 1993) (“[M]unicipalities may validly exercise zoning power solely to advance
aesthetic values, because the preservation or enhancement of the visual environment may
promote the general welfare.”). In other states, it is unclear whether aesthetics alone may
serve as justifications for zoning. See Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham, 451 A.2d 308, 311
(Me. 1982) (“[A]esthetic considerations, fear of deterioration in the value of neighboring
properties, and concern over an adverse impact on the town’s tax base are legitimate reasons
for enacting a[n] . . . ordinance . . . .” (citing Warren v. Mun. Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d
624, 628 (Me. 1981))).
131
But see Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that an ordinance banning all yard sale signs was illegitimate because it was
not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s alleged interest of preserving aesthetic
beauty and vistas).
132
See Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Law, and States’ Rights:
Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12
N.Y.U. ENVT L.J. 507 (2004) (discussing state renewable energy and wind subsidy schemes).
133
See Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce
Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Energy, 7 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY
L. 59 (2011). This article was cited as authority by a unanimous 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
in Ill. Com. Comm’n v. Fed. Regul. Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013) which upheld
Supremacy Clause power under the Federal Power Act. It was also cited by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Nextera Energy Resources, LLC v. Dep’t of Pub.
Util., 152 N.E.3d 48, 63–64 (Mass. 2020).
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ordinance could be stricken, or if there are less discriminatory means not utilized for
local regulation by the municipality.134
For instance, a federal court in New York found that aesthetic considerations
are a rational basis for zoning regulation.135 There is precedent for denying state
siting permits for wind projects when they would obstruct aesthetic views.136
In Sheffield, Vermont, wind project developers reduced the proposed number
of wind turbines by approximately 40% to be permitted.137 Neighbors challenged a
proposed single 100-foot tall wind turbine approximately 450 feet from owner
neighbor Halnon’s property line intruding on the neighbor’s distant view. 138
Proponent Halnon’s certificate of public good was denied when the Vermont Public
Service Board determined that “the net metering system as proposed, would have an
undue adverse effect on the aesthetics and scenic and natural beauty of the area in
which it is proposed,” finding that Halnon’s wind turbine would be “offensive and
shocking to the Rimonneaus [neighbors] and the average person in a similar
situation.”139 The Supreme Court of Vermont ultimately affirmed the State Board’s
decision to deny Halnon’s small wind project, which determined that the Board had
properly applied the Quechee test.140 Under this test, “a determination must first be
made as to whether a project will have an adverse impact on aesthetics and the scenic

134
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (“Madison plainly
discriminates against interstate commerce. This it cannot do, even in the exercise of its
unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are
available.”). Utilization of the least burdensome alternative for regulating commerce is still
good law cited by courts for the last seven decades. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S.
186, 192 (1994); Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 745 F.3d 362, 369 (6th Cir. 2013).
135
Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 158–59 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); see
also Martin v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 747
N.E.2d 131, 136, 152 (Mass. 2001) (holding aesthetics confer standing to challenge a zoning
decision, and is “among the factors to be considered in deciding whether a zoning
requirement ‘impairs the character’ of a proposed exempt use”).
136
Vermont Wind Project Shot Down, supra note 111.
137
Louis Porter, Kingdom Wind Project Downsizes; Sheffield Wind Developers Cut 10
Turbines in Effort to Address Various Concerns, WINDACTION (Sept. 25, 2006),
https://www.windaction.org/posts/4845 [https://perma.cc/3D8U-H296].
138 In re Halnon, 811 A.2d 161, 161 (Vt. 2002).
139
Id. at 162–63.
140
Id. at 166.
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and natural beauty of an area because it would not be in harmony with its
surroundings.”141
In Bomba v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Princeton, two neighbors
challenged the local zoning board of appeal’s (ZBA’s) decision which allowed the
local municipal utility and a private wind developer to construct two test towers to
assess whether the land would be a cost-effective location for wind turbines.142 The
local Princeton ZBA had decided that the test towers were exempt from the local
zoning by-law, which restricted the heights of structures because the test towers were
considered “public buildings” to which the ZBA’s decision was entitled to
deference.143 The Land Court judge was not persuaded by the ZBA’s arguments that
wind turbines qualified for the “public buildings” exception in the local by-law.144
Thus the court held that the ZBA’s decision was made on “legally untenable”
grounds and ruled for the project’s opponent.145
This case presented procedural and substantive issues regarding the difficulty
of challenging local zoning board decisions regarding wind zoning issues.
Procedurally, the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing in
their status as wind turbine site abutters and abutters of abutters within
approximately 300 feet of the proposed turbine site.146 However, the court found
standing because winter ice throws from the turbine blades could pose a hazard to
the plaintiffs walking on a nearby public way.147
Additionally, the court found that a noise nuisance was sufficient to grant
standing. 148 However, for a noise nuisance from a wind turbine, one must be

Id. at 163. If the project would adversely impact aesthetics, the courts will look to
(1) whether or not the project violates a clear, written community standard intended to
preserve the aesthetics, scenic, and natural beauty of the area; (2) whether or not the project
offends the sensibilities of the average person; and (3) if the applicants failed to take
generally available mitigating steps that a reasonable person would take to improve the
harmony of the proposed project with its surroundings. Id.
142
See Bomba v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Princeton, No. 293552, 2005 WL
2106162, at *1 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 1, 2005) (referring to a local zoning board of appeals
that exceeded authority by calling a wind turbine a “public building” for the purposes of the
local zoning law).
143
Id. at *2 (explaining that wind turbines do not fit neatly into any existing town
zoning law).
144
Id. at *6; Section VI.2(A) of the local bylaw states that the height restriction “does
not apply to a . . . public building,” but the bylaw does not explicitly define “public” or
“building.” Id. at *5.
145
Id. at *8 (disagreeing with ZBA’s analogy of a wind turbine to a public building).
146
Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A (defining requirements for standing to
challenge permits to abutters).
147
Bomba v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Princeton, No. 293552, 2005 WL
2106162 at *4 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 1, 2005); Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Newburyport, 660 N.E.2d 369, 372 (Mass. 1996).
148
Bomba, 2005 WL 2106162 at *4 (citing Bertrand v. Bd. of Appeals of Bourne, 58
Mass. App. Ct. 912, 912 (2003)).
141
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relatively near. 149 The court in Bomba rejected standing based on obstruction or
aesthetic nuisance alone without other nuisance factors present. 150 It remains
undecided in a community zoned for aesthetic considerations if aesthetics are
grounds for a common law nuisance challenge against a wind development project.
The standard view of most state courts holds that aesthetics alone cannot form the
basis of a private common law nuisance claim.151 A distant obstruction by wind
turbines of a ridgeline or mountain top that one does not own is less immediate than
other nuisance factors of noise, vibration, flicker, or ice throws.
In 2005, Plymouth, Massachusetts approved a by-law allowing large wind
turbines on municipally owned lots larger than five acres.152 The by-law, however,
was invalidated by the State Attorney General because the by-law gave an unfair
advantage to the town.153 After that, the town approved a by-law allowing wind
turbines up to 350 feet tall on any lots of five acres or more to be permitted through
the town’s special permit procedure.154 The height restriction is such that largerscale commercial turbines can be constructed in town on privately owned and
municipally owned land. As a second example, Billerica, Massachusetts, after a
proposal of a power plant to be sited in town, enacted a restriction requiring
additional local agency approval for siting a power facility, which the State Attorney

149

Id.; see Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); see
also Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879, 891 (W. Va. 2007)
(characterizing noise as cognizable as an abatable nuisance).
150
Bomba, 2005 WL 2106162 at *4 (citing Martin v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 Mass. 141 (2001)).
151
See generally Wernke v. Halas, 600 N.E.2d 117, 121–22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“[I]t
is well-settled throughout this country that, standing alone, unsightliness, or lack of aesthetic
virtue, does not constitute a private nuisance” (citations omitted)); Oliver v. AT&T Wireless
Services, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“The displeasing height and shape
of the new tower cannot, in and of itself, make it a nuisance to those who sit on the other side
of the property line.”); Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1, 1–2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (“It is
generally recognized that unsightliness, without more, does not create an actionable
nuisance.”).
152
Robert Knox, Turbines Generate Less Resistance – Planners Embrace Wind
Energy, but Procedure Is a Challenge, WINDACTION (Aug. 13, 2006), https://www.windact
ion.org/posts/3948-turbines-generate-less-resistance-planners-embrace-wind-energy-butprocedure-is-a-challenge#.YKqJJespDBI [https://perma.cc/E4JX-QX5E].
153
Id.
154
ZONING BYLAW OF THE TOWN OF PLYMOUTH, MASS. § 207-9,
https://www.plymouth-ma.gov/sites/g/files/vyhlif3691/f/uploads/zoning_bylaw_amended_
4-2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C53J-C28K].
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General’s municipal division disallowed under its review authority of local by-law
changes because a supermajority vote did not enact it.155
Many local governments have limited or prohibited the siting of wind turbines
based on ‘aesthetic’ zoning reasons. The Supreme Court defers to local government
on land-use issues, and many courts uphold aesthetic land-use zoning-out of wind
turbines if proper procedure is followed. Higher levels of government than localities
can preempt lower levels of government. The next Part analyzes how the federal
government has been found not to have preemptive power over local land use, while
states have this power, but most have not utilized it.
III. NO FEDERAL ROLE AND LIMITED STATE ROLE TO PREEMPT LOCAL LAND-USE
A. Uniquely Bifurcated Legal Regulation of U.S. Power
Electric power is the most regulated industry in the world and in the U.S.156
Regulatory authority over electric infrastructure is expressly split between state and
federal government agencies in the U.S. Through the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), the federal government exercises exclusive legal authority
over wholesale and interstate transactions in electric power.157 FERC exercises this
authority pursuant to Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act; 158 this
authority has been validated by federal courts.159
FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce” and over “all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric
energy.”160 The Supreme Court holds that “Congress meant to draw a bright line
155

See Chris Camire, Billerica Bylaw Bounced, THE SUN (July 15, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://www.lowellsun.com/2009/06/22/billerica-bylaw-bounced/ [https://perma.cc/WJX9X4ES]; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (“[N]o zoning ordinance or by-law or
amendment thereto shall be adopted or changed except by a two-thirds vote of all the
members of the town council, or of the city council where there is a commission form of
government or a single branch, or of each branch where there are 2 branches, or by a twothirds vote of a town meeting; provided, however, that the following shall be adopted by a
vote of a simple majority of all members of the town council or of the city council where
there is a commission form of government or a single branch or of each branch where there
are 2 branches or by a vote of a simple majority of town meeting. . . .”).
156
See Federal Regulations, EDISON ELEC. INST., https://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy
/pages/federalregulation.aspx [https://perma.cc/63YC-SB8Z] (last visited May 23, 2021)
(noting that investor-owned electric power companies are highly regulated at the federal and
state levels).
157
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b), (d), (e).
158
16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e.
159
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d on other
grounds, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
160
16 U.S.C. § 824(b); see also Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC 61,012, 61,030
(1995); Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 84 FERC 61,194, 61,973–75 (1998); Niagara Mohawk
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easily ascertained,” without individual case analysis, between state and federal
jurisdiction.161 Federal authority of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause preempts
inferior state regulation.162 FERC does not have any federally assumed or delegated
power to regulate the construction of any transmission facilities themselves: FERC
regulates only economic tariffs and terms for transactions moving power over
transmission facilities.163
Local governments exclusively retain authority under the Tenth Amendment
and exercise police power over all-electric facility land-use and siting. 164
Distribution of power, as opposed to the transmission of power,165 is regulated by
the states exclusively. 166 A state could expressly or impliedly preempt local
discretion over wind power siting infrastructure; this would cause some cities to
argue that this would impermissibly interfere with the residual local police power
over land use. 167 Approximately half of the states also add state regulation over
certain power facility siting, depending on whether this additional state layer
preempts local siting.168 However, such state siting authority often does not apply to
typical smaller wind power projects.169

Power Corp., 100 FERC 61,019, 61,017 (2002); Entergy Servs., Inc., 120 FERC 61,020,
61,061 (2007); Aquila Merch. Servs., Inc., 125 FERC 61,175, 61,927 (2008).
161
Federal Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
162
New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (holding that state
action was violation of Federal Power Act and the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution); see also Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246, 251 (1951); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986); Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003).
163
See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49841 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
(requiring nondiscriminatory access by all parties to transmission infrastructure).
164
What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/whatferc/what-ferc-does [https://perma.cc/AT58-VTRX] (last updated Nov. 19, 2020).
165
THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 78, at § 5:10; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
supra note 29, at 627; THE NEW RULES, supra note 22, at 23–24, 46–47.
166
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d on other
grounds, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008); Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by
Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49841 (Aug. 11, 2011)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 605.
167
For a discussion of preemption principles, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note
29, at 184–196.
168
See infra Part III.C.
169
See id.
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B. Supreme Court: Lack of Federal Energy Preemptive Authority
Courts determine whether there is any interstate commerce or other federal
basis for the federal government to exercise control over local land-use. The
Tenth Amendment reserves all constitutionally undesignated powers to the states
and localities.170 It is well-settled that zoning for land use is among the “police
powers” that municipalities retain under the Tenth Amendment as local authorities,
unless explicitly reserved or excepted by state statute.171 Underscoring deference to
local zoning, in the most recent decision construing local zoning laws, the Supreme
Court in Murr v. Wisconsin entirely deferred to local zoning by-laws as controlling
construction permits on land.172 This local zoning power has regulatory implications
for the siting of electric power generation; this power is exacerbated by the lack of
federal preemption in the area.
No area of energy is more thoroughly regulated at the superior national level
than civilian use of nuclear energy for power production.173 In Virginia Uranium v.
Warren,174 the Supreme Court considered whether the Atomic Energy Act (AEA)
preempts Virginia’s outright ban on uranium mining on land and its land use within
the Commonwealth. While the state had not banned new nuclear power plants, as
California had,175 it did ban the mining of uranium within the state. In its 2019
decision, the Court explained that while it might be appropriate to examine state
legislative intent for a law that prohibited something regulated by the federal
government, the Court would not do so when something did not fall under state
authority.176 The Gorsuch majority opinion stated that it was the norm in a federal
preemption analysis for the Court to not examine state legislative purpose and to
defer to state regulatory discretion.177 The majority found it inappropriate to examine
legislative intent with all the difficulties of requiring the judiciary to examine a state
legislature’s intent in passing a statute.178
In Virginia Uranium, the Court affirmed state and local control over nuclearrelated land use, notwithstanding federal regulation of nuclear health and safety,
explaining that while the AEA “gives the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
significant authority over the milling, transfer, use, and disposal of uranium, as well
as the construction and operation of nuclear power plants,” the federal statute
“leave[s] untouched the States’ historic authority over the regulation of mining

170

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See supra Part II.B.
172
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
173
See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 607–11.
174
Va. Uranium Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).
175
See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 185; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§25524.1.
176
Va. Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1905.
177
Id. at 1905–07.
178
Id.
171
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activities on private lands within their borders.” 179 In dissent, regarding the
deference that the Court showed to municipalities, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by
Justices Breyer and Alito) pointed out that the federal AEA recognizes that states
continue to have authority “to regulate activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards.”180
The tripartite split of the majority opinion, the concurring opinion, and the
dissent in this most recent Supreme Court opinion adjudicating federal preemption
of energy siting all conceded that there was no broad federal implied preemption of
power plant siting. The opinion is consistent with the lack of federal preemption
found in PG&E v. California, 181 decided approximately thirty-five years before,
which found no federal preemption of California’s authority to regulate economic
and police power elements of proposed new nuclear power generation facilities.
Congress attempted unsuccessfully to extend federal preemptive authority over
certain electric energy siting matters. A provision of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(EPAct 2005) attempted to expand the powers of the federal Department of Energy
and FERC to exercise federal siting authority over interstate electric power line
transmission projects in certain circumstances:
• It mandated that the Department undertake a transmission congestion study
every three years, the third of which was completed in 2015;182
• It allowed the Department to designate congested transmission corridors,
National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs) in “any
geographic area experiencing electric energy transmission capacity
constraints or congestion that adversely affects consumers;”183 and

179

Va. Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1900.
Id. at 1920 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k)).
181
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190 (1983).
182
16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(1). The congestion study is prepared “in consultation with
affected States.” Id.; see also Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072,
1080 (9th Cir. 2011).
183
16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(2).
180
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• It established an expedited process for FERC to approve new electric
transmission projects to obtain all federal siting permits within one year,
providing FERC “backstop authority” to issue construction permits for
projects in NIETCs if states withhold approval for more than a year, and
established eminent domain rights, otherwise within state authority, for
these NIETC projects.184
The U.S. Department of Energy designated two NIETCs since the enactment
of EPACT 2005; federal courts in the eastern and western U.S. overturned both
exercises of federal siting jurisdiction.185 After a state failed for twelve months to
approve the transmission permit for a new line to carry additional power to New
York and other cities, a federal court of appeals blocked FERC from granting a
federal permit after the state had considered but not approved it.186 Under the law,
the state was only required to take some action on the application within the year,
which in this case was the denial of the permit. That denial did not allow FERC to
intercede to supersede state authority on siting electric infrastructure. 187
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the U.S. Department of Energy failed to
properly consult with affected states in preparing its required Congestion Study and
failed to consider environmental effects pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act in the process of designating NIETCs for corridors in mid-Atlantic and
Southwestern states. 188 These two federal circuit court opinions arrested federal
authority to site electric power infrastructure in the U.S. or to countermand inferior
level of government decisions denying such electric infrastructures siting.
Where plenary state or federal regulation is present, regulation by a lower,
inferior level of government potentially could create an effective veto of the higherlevel government standards. Generally, a state or local government regulation
impliedly can be preempted by conflict preemption. In California Coastal
Commission v. Granite Rock Co., the Supreme Court found no preemption of
inferior state law where the state added environmental regulation as not an
impermissible exercise of state land-use planning reserved authority.189 However
while not finding preemption on the Granite Rock facts, the Court established the

184

Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric
Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440 (Dec. 1, 2006) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 50,
380) (creating a multi-year process for obtaining a federal permit to construct transmission
within an NIETC).
185
Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1107.
186
Piedmont Env’t Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 320 (4th Cir. 2009).
187
Id.
188
Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1107.
189
480 U.S. 572 (1987) (discussing whether state environmental regulation conflicted
with the National Forest Management Act).
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principle prohibiting ‘conflict’ preemption where a state or local law could not
unilaterally negate a federal permit.190
In a limited subset of locations where the federal government has an ownership
interest, there can be federal preemption of local land-use permitting decisions. The
federal government generally controls land use permitting for development on
federal lands. 191 For very limited matters involving privately-owned local land,
federal preemption may overrule state and local control over certain development
proposals, including telecommunications towers providing personal wireless
services to local areas.192
Other than this, federal statutory enactments have failed to buttress any federal
preemptive power over electric energy facility siting. In addition, recent holdings of
the Supreme Court defer to local zoning determinations, as well as to local authority
on energy facility land-use matters.193 Inferior level local government continues to
control land and land use in the U.S. (excluding federal land). Wind power requires
large amounts of land because it is a much less dense energy source. 194
Notwithstanding incentives promoting wind energy projects,195 local government’s
exclusive authority to regulate land use aesthetically can operate as a unilateral,
locally imposed barrier.196
190

Cf. id. at 588–89, 593–94 (noting that since Granite Rock brought a facial challenge
to the California permitting requirement, and since it could not show that “any possible set
of conditions” were invalid, its challenge failed).
191
U.S. CONST, art. IV, § 3, cl 2; see also United States v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940) (finding that the Property Clause gives Congress authority
over federal property generally and explaining that the Supreme Court has described
Congress’s power to legislate under this Clause as being “without limitations”); see generally
Michael C. Blumm & James A Fraser, Coordinating with the Federal Government:
Assessing County Efforts to Control Decisionmaking on Public Lands, 38 PUB. LAND & RES.
L. REV. 1 (2017) (outlining the case law on federal preemption of local land use decisions,
and arguing that local governments have minimal control over federal lands). But see Cal.
Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 585–89 (1987) (assuming, without
deciding that FLPMA and NFMA preempt state and local land use plans on federal land, but
holding that states may still impose environmental regulations).
192
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (disallowing states and local government from prohibiting
the provisioning of wireless services).
193
See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); see also Va. Uranium, Inc. v.
Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).
194
See Outka, supra note 82.
195
See THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 78, at §§ 3:59.10, 3:59.40,
10:114–10:115.30.
196
See GREEN & SAGRILLO, supra note 91, at 1 (“Prospective distributed wind buyers
frequently encounter the dilemma that existing zoning ordinances do not address wind
turbines, nor do they typically allow structures taller than 35 ft.”).
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C. State Preemption as the Antidote to Supreme Court Limitation on Federal
Authority to Preempt
The Supreme Court has articulated that states exercise “traditional and primary
power over land and water use.” 197 State governments create local power. 198
Pursuant to states being superior to their municipalities, each state should be able to
preempt its local governments’ exercises of zoning power to frustrate renewable
energy and address climate change.
Legally, the state-local relationships vary. Thirty-nine states follow Dillon’s
Rule, which withholds from local governments any authority that is not expressly
delegated by state legislative statute to the localities.199 In the alternative to Dillon’s
Rule, eleven states are Home Rule states, which vests all powers not expressly
reserved by state statute in the localities.200 The former type of state legal system is
preemptive at the superior state level of government, while the latter vests localities
with extensive reserved power unless the state conscripts such powers by legislation.
A state, from which cities derive their powers, can directly preempt local landuse laws.201 States can exercise a similar indirect power by not approving changes
to local regulations, as occurred in Plymouth202 and Billerica,203 Massachusetts. In
such instances, a state with such powers could elect not to approve a particular
change to a local zoning by-law that restricts certain renewable power generation
siting decisions. Some states also preempt siting of certain electric generation
facilities.204
Energy facility siting of both electric transmission lines and generation
infrastructure remains jurisdictionally vested in local and state governments rather
than the federal government. 205 States could preempt local government siting
authority for electric power infrastructure, since local governments obtain their
governing power from state government.206 In Dillon’s Rule states, states can change
the scope of local delegation of renewable infrastructure siting power. In Home Rule
states, because electricity is in intra-state commerce and because all states that have

197
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
174 (2001).
198
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 185.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 21; id. ch. 40A, § 3 (providing an example of a state
that has partially preempted local regulation of siting facilities regarding affordable housing
for lower-income persons and for child-care facilities).
202
See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
203
See supra notes 155 and accompanying text.
204
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 69H; see generally 980 MASS. CODE REGS. 1–12.
205
See supra Part III.A.
206
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 185.
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private utilities have state public utilities commissions207 with regulatory jurisdiction
over the electric power sector of the economy, states can regulate electric power
infrastructure siting if they so choose. But there is a split on which states have so
chosen and their current effective reach.
An analysis of at what level each of the 50 states allocates electric energy
generation facility siting authority illustrates several models balancing local landuse control and superior government state preemption:
• In twenty-three states, there is no state electric energy generation siting
authority exercised as a matter of law for new power generation facilities to
be sited and constructed. In this group, siting electric power facilities is
exclusively a local determination operating in the void of state siting
authority.208
• The remaining twenty-seven states plus the District of Columbia209 exercise
state authority over power facility siting, with some having divested some
of their energy infrastructure siting authority to localities, as noted below:
Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska note: which has no investor-owned utilities in state to regulate),
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Washington.

207
See About Us: Regulatory Commissions, NAT’L ASSOC’N OF REGUL. UTIL.
COMM’RS, https://www.naruc.org/about-naruc/regulatory-commissions/ [https://perma.cc/
DY6F-BTMW] (last visited Aug. 5, 2022).
208
The states with no state power generation siting authority are Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. State Approaches to Wind Facility Siting, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/statewind-energy-siting.aspx [https://perma.cc/56X2-GGWY] (“In at least 22 states, siting
regulations are primarily the responsibility of local governments.”).
209
See infra 213–276 and accompanying text; cf. State Approaches to Wind Facility
Siting, supra note 208.
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Figure 3: Cumulative U.S. Wind Power Capacity by Owner210

In addition to which level of state or local government exercises energy facility
siting, there is a key differentiation regarding the type of wind energy project
developer. As Figure 3 shows, 80% of new generation facilities each year are
constructed by unregulated non-utility independent power producers (IPPs) rather
than regulated utilities. 211 This dominant IPP role is forecast to continue as
renewable power generation accelerates.212 As a side note, twelve of the twenty-

210

RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER, GALEN BARBOSE, NAIM DARGHOUTH, BEN HOEN,
ANDREW MILLS, JOE RAND, DEV MILLSTEIN, SEONGEUN JEONG, KEVIN PORTER ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2018 WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT (2019),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/08/f65/2018%20Wind%20Technologies%20
Market%20Report%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/844E-H5MJ].
211
Id. at vii; J. BRUCE MCDONALD, MICHAEL BARDEE, JOHN H. SEESEL, DAVID MEYER
& KAREN LARSEN, ELECTRIC ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON WHOLESALE AND RETAIL COMPETITION MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 10
(2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/electric-energy-marketcompetition-task-force-report-congress-competition-wholesale-and-retail/epact-final-rpt.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QC57-S3G7] (“In the 1970s, vertically integrated utility companies
(investor-owned, municipal, or cooperative) controlled over 95 percent of the electric
generation in the United States . . . by 2004 electric utilities owned less than 60 percent of
electric generating capacity. Increasingly, decisions affecting retail customers and electricity
rates are split among federal, state, and new private, regional entities.”); Steven Ferrey, Sale
of Electricity, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 217–218
(Michael B. Gerrard ed., Am. Bar Ass’n Press, 2011); see Shear, supra note 65.
212
U.S.
Solar
Market
Insight,
SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N,
http://www.seia.org/research-resources/us-solar-market-insight
[https://perma.cc/PA7BLVXM] (last updated June 7, 2022).
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three states that do not exercise state energy facility siting authority also have
statutes that exempt from state authority any independent non-utility IPP electric
infrastructure, which is now dominant in U.S. wind power development:
Alabama,213 Arkansas,214 Colorado,215 Delaware,216 Indiana,217 Idaho,218 Kansas,219
Michigan,220 Mississippi,221 Missouri,222 Texas,223 and Wyoming.224 In these twelve
states, independent non-utility companies which dominate wind power generation

213
ALA. CODE. § 37-4-2 (limiting Commission jurisdiction to exclude nonutility
generators). The Alabama Public Service Commission has no siting jurisdiction over “wind
generation or generation facilitates proposed by a non-regulated utility.” TOM STANTON,
NAT’L ASS’N OF REGUL. UTIL. COMM’RS, WIND ENERGY & WIND PARK SITING AND ZONING
BEST PRACTICES AND GUIDANCE FOR STATES A-3 (2012), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/FA86
63AC-A840-E8B3-FC1D-C7AFEC3ED9D6 [https://perma.cc/J29S-UVTC].
214
ARK. CODE § 23-3-201 (noting utilities must obtain certificate stating public
convenience and necessity require construction); see Electric Section, ARK. PUB. SERV.
COMM’N, http://www.apscservices.info/electric.asp [https://perma.cc/VV5K-UJ56] (last
visited Aug. 5, 2022) (noting the Arkansas Commission will not regulate municipally owned
utilities, public power agencies, or exempt wholesale generators (Independent Power
Producers)).
215
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-5-101 (certifying public utilities intending to construct
a new facility).
216
See DEL. CODE tit. 26, § 201(a) (giving jurisdiction of energy facilities to Delaware
Public Service Commission); but see id. § 203A(a)(3) (allowing construction of facility
within utilities existing territory).
217
IND. CODE § 8-1-8.5-7 (noting public utility may not begin construction without
certificate).
218
IDAHO CODE §§ 61-526–61-528 (mandating that only regulated utilities that seek
certificate merchant plants need environmental and local approval).
219
KAN. STAT. § 66-101 (giving the Kansas State Corporation Commission jurisdiction
over electric public utilities).
220
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.502.
221
MISS. CODE § 77-3-14(6) (clarifying electric generation facilities built for person’s
own use do not require certification).
222
Missouri law states that all electric corporations must obtain a certificate, but defines
“electric corporation” to exclude producers generating electricity for private use on private
land. See MO. REV. STAT. § 386.020(15); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 393.170.
223
The Texas PUC requires certificates for public utilities to serve areas outside their
already allocated service area. TEX. UTIL. CODE § 37.051; see generally The Brattle Group,
Survey of Transmission Siting Practices in the Midwest, EDISON ELEC. INST. (2004),
https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/538D82DD-2354-D714-5157-244A2AA66041 [https://perma.cc
/EM32-TEYG] (noting that generally, siting is a primarily local process).
224
WYO. STAT. § 37-2-205 (requiring Commission certificate for construction of most
new lines or plants).
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development must only satisfy routine local land-use and zoning authorities for basic
construction permission.
Thus, of these initial twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia that have
state energy siting laws, five of these states also require the applicant project
developer of a wind facility separately to obtain all local land-use approvals from
the local municipalities: New Jersey,225 Nevada,226 North Carolina,227 Wisconsin,228
and Virginia.229 Three of these five states allow local regulations to be preempted
only under limited special circumstances: New Jersey, 230 Nevada, 231 and
Wisconsin.232
This leaves twenty-two of the original twenty-seven states, plus the District of
Columbia, that, on siting an energy facility, otherwise could preempt any conflict
with local municipal land-use authority: Arizona,233 California,234 Connecticut,235
District of Columbia, 236 Florida, 237 Iowa, 238 Kentucky, 239 Maine, 240 Maryland, 241

225

See Eric Garofano, Note, Losing Power: Siting Power Plants in New York State, 4
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 728, 747–48 (2011).
226
NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.890.
227
4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 11.R8-63.
228
See The Brattle Group, supra note 223, at 5–8; see also STATE OF WIS. DEP’T OF
NAT. RES., ELECTRIC UTILITY PRE-CPCN APPROVAL AND APPLICATION (2004).
229
See VA. CODE § 56-234.3 (stating requirements for utilities).
230
See N.J. STAT. § 40:55D-19.
231
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.890.
232
The Brattle Group, supra note 223, at 10.
233
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 40-360.05(2) (allowing “each county and municipal government
and state agency interested in the proposed site” to become a party to the certification
proceedings at the state, rather than local, level).
234
See Garofano, supra note 225, at 744; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25500.
235
See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 16-50j.
236
See D.C. CODE §§ 34-301 to 34-302.
237
See FLA. STAT. §§ 403.502, 403.506, 403.508(f) (“The board may, if it determines
. . . that it is in the public interest to authorize the use of the land for a site or associated
facility, authorize a variance or other necessary approval . . . .”).
238
See IOWA CODE § 476A.5 (“The failure of a facility to meet zoning requirements
established pursuant to chapters 329, 335 and 414 shall not preclude the board from issuing
the certificate . . . .”).
239
See KY. REV. STAT. § 278.704(1). The statute allows some local set-back control
over siting short of blanket restriction. Id. § 278.704(3) (“If the merchant electric generating
facility is proposed to be located in a county or a municipality with planning and zoning,
then setback requirements from a property boundary, residential neighborhood, school,
hospital, or nursing home facility may be established by the planning and zoning
commission.”).
240
See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3453 (giving the Maine Land Use Planning
Commission primary authority over wind energy siting); see also id. tit. 12, § 685-A.
241
See MD. CODE REGS. § 20.79.01.04; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Washington
Cnty. v. Perennial Solar, LLC, 212 A.3d 868, 888 (Md. 2019) (“[T]he ultimate decisionmaker is the PSC, not the local government or local zoning board.”).
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Massachusetts,242 Minnesota,243 Montana,244 Nebraska,245 New Hampshire,246 New
Mexico, 247 New York, 248 North Dakota, 249 Ohio, 250 Oregon, 251 Rhode Island, 252
South Dakota, 253 Vermont, 254 and Washington. 255 Three other jurisdictions are
uniquely positioned: The District of Columbia has no state-level authority with its
non-state political structure and status; Montana explicitly does not exercise state
siting over wind generation projects among energy projects regulated; 256 and
Nebraska, because no power plants are investor-owned in the state, does not regulate

242

See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 164, § 69K (“The board shall, upon petition, consider an
application for a certificate of environmental impact and public interest if it finds that any
state or local agency has imposed a burdensome condition or limitation on any license or
permit which has a substantial impact on the board’s responsibilities. . . .”).
243
See MINN. STAT. § 216E.03 subdiv. 1; MINN. STAT. § 216E.05 subdiv. 1; see also
MINN. STAT. § 216E.10 (“Such permit shall supersede and preempt all zoning, building, or
land use rules, regulations, or ordinances promulgated by regional, county, local and special
purpose government.”).
244
See MONT. CODE. §§ 75-20-103, 401.
245
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 70-1012.
246
See N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 162-H:1–162-H:23 (granting the state primary authority
over energy facility siting). But see id. § 674:63 (allowing reasonable regulation of wind
energy systems by municipalities).
247
See N.M. STAT. § 62-9-3(G) (allowing the state to approve siting even when it
violates municipal land use regulations when the “regulation is unreasonable restrictive and
compliance with the regulation is not in the interest of the public convenience and
necessity”).
248
See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 168(3)(e) (“The board may elect not to apply, in whole
or in part, any local ordinance, law, resolution or other action or any regulation issued
thereunder or any local standard or requirement. . . .”).
249
N.D. CENT. CODE. §49-22-07.
250
OHIO REV. CODE. § 4906.13; see also Garofano, supra note 225, at 748–49.
251
See OR. REV. STAT. § 469.401(3) (noting certificate binds all state entities, counties,
and cities to the approval of the site).
252
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-98-9.
253
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-7.
254
City of South Burlington v. Vermont Elec. Power Co., 344 A.2d 19 (1975) (holding
that the Public Service Commission preempted the City’s orders).
255
See WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.030.
256
See MONT. CODE § 75-20-104(9) (regulating only “generating facilities that produce
electricity from coal-fired steam turbines, oil or gas turbines, or turbine generators driven by
falling water”).
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these non-existent entities.257 This reduces effective state-level preemption to twenty
states.
Moreover, in these twenty states that preempt local regulation of utility energy
facilities, state siting authority misses many wind projects because there are
minimum size thresholds for the state to exercise jurisdiction that are set too high to
include modest-sized on-shore wind turbine in twenty states, plus three of the five
states that also preserve and require necessary local permitting (Nevada, North
Carolina, Wisconsin) do not regulate smaller power projects that dominate wind and
other renewable projects. Of these twenty-three states:
• Iowa, 258 New York, 259 and Oregon 260 mandate commission approval and
certification for electric generation plants with a generation capacity of 25
MW or more;
• New Hampshire261 exercises jurisdiction over facilities of at least 30 MW;
• Rhode Island262 may exercise siting jurisdiction over facilities of 40 MW or
more;
• Minnesota,263 North Dakota,264 and Ohio265 exercise jurisdiction over new
plants of 50 MW or more;
• Maryland266 and Nevada267 regulate new facilities of 70 MW or more;
• Florida268 regulates new electric generation facilities of 75 MW or more;

257

Nebraska Power Review Board’s Orientation Manual: Historical Perspective, NEB.
POWER
REV.
BD.,
http://www.powerreviewboard.nebraska.gov/prbmanual/2.html
[https://perma.cc/EUA3-F38V] (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).
258
See IOWA CODE § 476A.1.5.
259
See NY PUB. SERV. LAW § 172; PATRICIA E. SALKIN, 2 N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC.,
§ 11:23. MUNICIPALLY OWNED UTILITIES.
260
See OR. REV. STAT. § 469.300.
261
See N.H. REV. STAT. § 162-H:2 (defining “energy facility” for the purposes of
regulation under N.H. REV. STAT. § 162-H:4).
262
R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-98-3 (defining major energy facility as capable of operating at
40 MW or more).
263
MINN. STAT. § 216B.2421 (defining what size power plants and transmission lines
will be subject to this process).
264
N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22-03.
265
OHIO REV. CODE. § 4906.04.
266
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-207.1; MD. CODE REGS. 20.79.01.03 (exempting
plants that do not meet the definition listed in § 7-207.1).
267
NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.860.
268
See FLA. STAT. § 403.506.
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• Arizona, 269 California, 270 Massachusetts, 271 South Dakota, 272 and
Wisconsin273 exercise siting authority over facilities of 100 MW or more.
• New Mexico, 274 North Carolina, 275 and Washington 276 set jurisdiction at
new facilities of 300 MW or more.
Indeed, “[u]tility-scale wind turbines typically range from 1.5 to 3.5 [MW] . . .
and the average installed size is 2.2 MW.”277 Many land-based wind projects, adding
the cumulative output of all turbines proposed, often do not exceed 25 MW, 50 MW,
or 100 MW in capacity such that state law would trigger relevant preemptive state
jurisdiction over the project. This leaves only local land-use control. For example,
25 MW of generation typically will power the entire campus, research labs,
dormitories, and on-campus demands of large university campuses, such as Harvard
University or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 278 Such smaller wind
energy projects in fifteen of these twenty-three states (including the District of
Columbia) are not subject to state jurisdiction by virtue of their size. This reduces
the earlier twenty states by an additional net seventeen states not exercising siting
authority over smaller renewable energy projects
Thus, analyzing the twenty-seven states and D.C. with any state-level statutory
electric power generation facility siting authority that could, in theory, preempt local
‘aesthetic’ zoning that bars new wind electric power facilities (with some states
having multiple factors below each negating effective state authority):

269

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 40-360.09.
See Garofano, supra note 225, at 744–45; See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25541.
271
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164 § 69J.
272
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-2.
273
See WIS. STAT. § 196.491.
274
See N.M. STAT. §§ 62-9-3(A), (G).
275
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.1 (requiring certificate for any person generating utility
sold to the general public); 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 11.R8-61 (clarifying that plants that produce
over 300 MW or are included in the rate base are subject to greater scrutiny).
276
See WASH. CODE §§ 80.50.20(14), 80.50.060.
277
State Approaches to Wind Facility Siting, supra note 208.
278
See Colin Durrant, Highly Efficient Energy System to Power Harvard’s Allston
Campus, HARV. UNIV. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://green.harvard.edu/news/highly-efficientenergy-system-power-harvards-allston-campus
[https://perma.cc/H5CX-97JC];
CUP
Upgrade Project, MASS. INST. OF TECH. CENT. UTIL. PLANT, https://powering.mit.edu
[https://perma.cc/AH25-VLBS] (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); Renewable Energy, HARV. UNIV.
(2022), https://green.harvard.edu/topics/climate-energy/renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/
7V6T-MEB9].
270

108

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

• Five require that the project also separately obtain local zoning and land-use
approvals which provides the local government an effective permit veto;
• Three are exempted for unique reasons;
• Nineteen can exercise jurisdiction only over larger power facility siting
projects that do not include many wind projects; and
• Not every state includes authority over the 80% of wind projects developed
by independent ‘merchant’ developers.
With the three above-bulleted realities, only four states retain significant authority
over typically-sized land-sited wind projects: Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, and
Vermont.
What initially appears to be twenty-seven states plus the District of Columbia—
a majority—that are already legally structured to preempt their municipalities’ local
power infrastructure siting authority, are significantly narrowed when that authority
is scaled against the size reality of renewable energy projects. Screened out of
nineteen states’ legal reach are wind projects of small or modest size or capacity,
and in some states the substantial majority of wind projects developed by
independent non-utility developers, and there are five states that still require that a
local permit be independently granted by the town or city rather than preempted at
the state level. These factors net to less than a handful of states with preemptive
state-level wind infrastructure siting authority for sustainable new wind power
generation siting.
Thus, exclusive local jurisdiction over typical wind electric power generation
project siting remains the U.S. norm by default in more than 90% of the states. Since
there is no other yet-court-recognized federal legal authority over energy facility
siting on non-federal land in the states,279 local land-use and zoning authority remain
the dominant legal authority over renewable infrastructure development, regardless
of incentives for renewable energy development from higher federal or state levels
of government.
IV. SUPREMACY CLAUSE INVERSION: INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS SUCCESSFULLY TO
SITE RENEWABLE POWER UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW
Against the existing local zoning bottleneck, there are innovative legal
workarounds to circumvent local zoning that blocks renewable, sustainable
infrastructure siting. Since there is no expeditious way to change the Constitution,
nor will the foundational legal separation of U.S. powers between federal, state, and
local jurisdiction be restructured in the near term, this Part strategically develops six
innovative legal mechanisms within the parameters of current U.S. law and
precedent to circumvent local ‘aesthetic’ wind zoning in time to meet U.S. climate
change goals and commitments.

279

See Piedmont Env’t Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009).
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For context on federal climate-related initiatives, the Biden Administration
infrastructure law authorizes $65 billion over the next five years for energy projects
that could include certain electricity transmission projects.280 But these expenditures
are also devoted to preventing outages, research and development of grid reliability
and resilience, developing technologies to enhance grid flexibility, and funds for
state energy programs.281 The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act provides an additional
$369 billion of extended tax credits and loans for zero-carbon generation projects,
but does not add additional significant amounts of federal authority outside of the
financial benefits contained in extended tax credits, tax rules, and federal money
devoted to generation projects.282
Princeton University researchers found that addressing new renewable wind
energy transmission needs would require a 60% expansion of the U.S. high-voltage
transmission network by 2030, with capacity of power tripled by 2050.283 The capital
cost of these new power lines is estimated at $360 billion within the next eight years
and $2.4 trillion by 2050.284 The Biden Administration funding would address only
a fraction of this need.285 While this offers some funding, the Biden Administration
infrastructure bill contains one attempt to reinvigorate a previously court-stricken
mechanism to attempt to overcome municipal ‘aesthetic’ zoning restrictions that bar
wind turbines. And that provision is likely to face state challenge as usurpation of
their traditional siting authority.
280

Fact Sheet: Department of Commerce’s Use of Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal
Funding to Help Close the Digital Divide, U.S. DEPT. OF COM. (Nov. 10, 2021),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2021/11/fact-sheet-department-commercesuse-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal-funding [https://perma.cc/RN5D-79BL].
281
E&E News Staff, What the Infrastructure Deal Means for Energy, E&E NEWS:
ENERGYWIRE (July 30, 2021, 07:29 AM), https://www.eenews.net/articles/what-theinfrastructure-deal-means-for-energy/ [https://perma.cc/5GJL-NZ2K]; see also UPDATED
FACT SHEET: Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 2,
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/02/updated
-fact-sheet-bipartisan-infrastructure-investment-and-jobs-act/
[https://perma.cc/4QDJ9LSV].
282
See supra note 2 and accompanying text; cf. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub.
L. No. 117-169.
283
E&E News Staff, supra note 281.
284
Id.
285
The Biden Administration’s proposed infrastructure bill also would attempt to
reinvigorate the EPACT 2005 federal authority to compel high-priority transmission siting
through states that resist it by interceding if state agencies reject the proposals or fail to act
on them within a year. Id. However, before interceding, FERC would need to consider
whether the applicant for a transmission project had “engaged states and non-federal entities
in good faith consultations and in a timely manner.” Id. This potential might preempt a very
limited number of state barriers to new transmission facilities to move renewable power.
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This Part introduces ways to address this remaining significant legal obstacle
by identifying strategic openings within existing U.S. law to circumvent local
‘aesthetic’ restrictions on necessary renewable wind power infrastructure. Section A
reviews possible solutions to step beyond local control, including prioritizing
development on federal land, and prioritizing offshore development—each relocates
wind facilities to not be within any municipal jurisdictions or control. Section B
discusses the use of a local special use permit in lieu of ‘aesthetic’ zoning, thus
retaining but narrowing local control to operate on a case-by-case basis rather than
blanket zoning prohibitions. Section C discusses the twenty-seven states and D.C.
extending their existing state preemption of local zoning, and illustrates potential
pitfalls with Massachusetts’ experience. Finally, Section D examines state
integration of the Supreme Court Dean Milk requirement for local ordinances and
reactivating common law nuisance claims.
Because each of these provisions below requires no change in existing U.S.
law, these can create a legal ‘road map’ to meet the Biden Administration’s timelines
and help stabilize global warming.
A. Stepping Beyond All Locally Controlled Land
1. Prioritizing Use of a Distinct 30% of U.S. Land
The first opportunity to avoid local ‘aesthetic’ zoning restrictions identifies and
prioritizes for use 30% of U.S. land that is likely not subject to conflicting local,
county, or municipal control. More than 600 million acres, or 30% of the U.S. land,
are owned by the federal government and under its public management: 58% of
which is restricted but allow for multiple uses.286 While the Supreme Court has held
that the Property Clause itself does not preempt state and local regulation of federal
land,287 it has assumed, without deciding, that federal land use statutes preempt state

286
John D. Leshy, Still made for You and Me?, 89 AM. SCHOLAR 34, 36 (2020)
(explaining that 25% of American land is congressionally protected in manners that make it
more difficult to develop, but allow multiple use. A remaining 33% is protected by prior
executive branch decisions, that can be reversed by future presidents, unless subsequently
prohibited by Congress).
287
See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542–43 (1976) (“[W]hile Congress can
acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands within a State by the State’s consent or
cession, the presence or absence of such jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress’ powers
under the Property Clause. Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction
over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact
legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And when Congress so
acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy
Clause.”); Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580 (1987) (holding that
the Property Clause does not categorically exempt all federal lands from all state regulation).
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and local land use controls on federal land. 288 State environmental regulations,
however, are not preempted.289 Thus, where a local government sought to prohibit
renewable development in conflict with federal land management agency’s actions,
it would be preempted.290 The Biden Administration could prioritize the best wind
sites on this 30% of U.S. land for renewable power development during the next few
years, within the rapid time frame necessary to transition to low-carbon electric
energy by 2030. This can be accomplished with no additional legislation and no
change of laws.
The next subsections address the remaining 70% of U.S. land not federally
owned by identifying mechanisms and pathways to expedite renewable power siting
and mitigate global warming without amending U.S. law. The Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act attempts to do this using an approach somewhat similar to
a prior federal statute to expedite siting which was stricken by federal courts and
requires new legislative enactments:291 Amending Section 216 of the Federal Power
Act to grant FERC authority to supersede traditional state siting decisions for electric
transmission projects:292
• When the state energy regulatory authority has not made a determination on

a transmission permit application for more than one year;
• When the state energy authority adds conditions to approval to not

significantly reduce transmission capacity constraints or congestion; or

• When the state energy authority denies the siting permit.

The final bullet above represents a wholesale preemption of any state siting
approval discretion if it does not please the current presidential administration. This
will create additional controversy with state authority as well as additional barriers:
Federal actions to intercede will require preparation of environmental impact
statements under the National Environmental Policy Act, which takes years of

288
See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 585–86. See also S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence
Cnty., 155 F.3d 1005, 1009–11 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding local zoning regulations that per se
prohibited mining on federal land were preempted); Bohmker v. Oregon, 903 F.3d 1029,
1040–1051 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding state regulations related to fish habitat, which prohibited
certain mining, were not preempted).
289
Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 585–589.
290
See Lawrence Cnty., 155 F.3d 1009–11; Blumm & Fraser, supra note 191, at 36–48
(arguing that federal law either field preempts or conflict preempts municipal land use
directives on federal land).
291
See Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 40105, 135 Stat.
429 (2022).
292
Id. § 40105(b)(1)(C).
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additional time prior to any construction activities.293 As well, there are currently no
required prerequisite U.S. Department of Energy DOE-designated NIETC corridors
to empower FERC authority pursuant to Section 216.294
The mechanisms below avoid this. Moreover, local law enacted in 35,000
communities is too disaggregated and dispersed to alter on a municipality-bymunicipality basis. Avoiding these limitations, each solution below identifies
mechanisms operating through state law at the intermediate level of authority in the
U.S. federalist system.295 The next subsection below maps how to avoid local landuse regulation by exiting the land to capture the wind.
2. Avoiding Land and Local Land-Use Control
Once three miles from shore in the oceans along U.S. coasts, the federal
government exercises exclusive authority over wind power siting on the continental
shelf and in the U.S. The continental shelf is the seaward extension of the belowwater continental land mass, delineating the border between the ocean’s crust and
the continental crust, including for the U.S. approximately 760,000 square nautical
miles.296 The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) in the Department of
the Interior (DoI) regulates the permit process for offshore wind.297 In contrast, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates the permit process for ocean oil
and gas under the Department of Energy.298 BOEM has a four-step process for its
permitting offshore wind development on the outer continental shelf: (1) planning
and analysis, (2) lease issuance, (3) site assessment, and (4) construction and
operations.299 There are leases already granted for many thousands of megawatts of
capacity for offshore wind installation. Figure 4 below shows the Department of

293

See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1–1502.24; see also Cal. Wilderness
Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1105.
294
See U.S DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION
STUDY vi (2020), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2020/10/f79/2020%20Congest
ion%20Study%20FINAL%2022Sept2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH9P-YF5X].
295
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3 (2017) (prohibiting municipalities from
unreasonably regulating “the installation of solar energy systems . . . except where necessary
to protect the public health, safety or welfare.”). The statute defines solar energy systems as
“a device or structural design feature, a substantial purpose of which is to provide daylight
for interior lighting or provide for the collection, storage and distribution of solar energy for
space heating or cooling, electricity generating, or water heating.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
40A, § 1A.
296
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 541.
297
30 C.F.R. § 585 (2021).
298
See Overview of FERC, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N , https://www.ferc.gov/whatferc/overview-ferc [https://perma.cc/RTZ9-N4UU] (last updated June 6, 2022).
299
See Regulatory Framework and Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU
OF
OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/regulatoryframework-and-guidelines [https://perma.cc/5T5V-N9MC] (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
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Interior BOEM Atlantic Ocean federal wind power lease areas, which are in various
stages of development.300
Figure 4301

300

See supra Figure 1.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF RENEWABLE ENERGY LEASES MAP BOOK 2 (Mar. 2019),
https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/renewable-energy-program/Mapping-and-Data/
Renewable_Energy_Leases_Map_Book_March_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8UW-N9TQ].
301
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Local governments have no jurisdiction three miles beyond a city’s most
seaward land boundary.302 As shown by Figure 5, the offshore areas of the U.S. have
the some of the best wind velocities in the U.S. to harness. With exclusive federal
control over 30% of U.S. land, over all ocean areas more than three miles off the
state coasts, and in the U.S. portion of the Great Lakes, all of which exhibit some of
the best wind velocities in the U.S.,303 there is a substantial portion of Earth surface
area of water and under exclusive U.S. jurisdiction on which to site wind power
resources with no local or state legal zoning or regulatory control.
Figure 5304

B. Shifting Legal Burdens: Special Permits in Lieu of Local ‘Aesthetic’ Zoning
Ordinances
A second opportunity utilizing existing law for legal ‘triage’ would be for local
governments to be limited by their states to require a local case-by-case special
302

ADAM VANN, WIND ENERGY: OFFSHORE PERMITTING 1–2 (2021),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R40175.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5XH-82TH] (“The Submerged
Lands Act of 1953 assured coastal states control over the lands beneath coastal waters in an
area stretching three miles from the shore in most places, and nine miles in others.” (citations
omitted)).
303
See infra Figure 5.
304
U.S. Wind Speed at 10-Meter above Surface Level (illustration), in Wind Resource
Maps and Data, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.nrel.gov/gis/assets/images/wtk-10m-2017-01.jpg
[https://perma.cc/JH5XYBHS].
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permit for siting energy infrastructure, instead of imposing a blanket ‘aesthetic’
zoning restriction that does not consider particular circumstances or cases.305 Since
local governments derive their power from their states, state law could require
municipalities to utilize a project-specific special permit, with conditions included
to reduce any excessive proximate noise, vibration, visual flicker, or reduce and
buffer nuisance impacts (as created in a proposed Massachusetts wind-siting
amendment)306 as a more targeted and less burdensome municipal tool than the use
of a blanket ‘aesthetic’ zoning law.307 Special permits are issued only if a project is
found to meet specific development criteria outlined in the local zoning by-law.308
For instance, Minuteman Wind, a Massachusetts wind developer, was required
to obtain a special permit to site and develop its proposed 12.5 MW wind project in
Savoy, Massachusetts.309 Likewise, in Wisconsin, Navitas Energy, Inc. was required
to first secure a special conditional use permit from the Manitowoc County Board
of Adjustment to build a 49-turbine wind energy park.310 If states were to exercise
their authority to require smart environmental siting criteria and sufficient nuisance
mitigation measures for specific projects—rather than ‘aesthetic’ zoning regulations
a priori taking out of use large tracts of municipally controlled land—more nonfederal land would be opened for potential evaluation of wind project location.
305

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 559.
See infra note 322.
307
GREEN & SAGRILLO, supra note 91, at 2, 4 (demonstrating an example of aesthetic
approval regarding wind turbine approval and showing that fewer communities allow for
turbines as permitted (as-of-right) uses).
308
Criteria may be very broad, including additional levels of environmental protection,
noise avoidance, visual appearance, traffic impact, compatibility with surrounding areas,
municipal planning objectives, and more. See generally What Is a Special Permit? TOWN OF
SEEKONK, MASS., https://www.seekonk-ma.gov/zoning-board-appeals/faq/what-specialpermit [https://perma.cc/WV8U-M2N8] (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
309
See Larry Parnass, Savoy Wind Turbine Project Concedes Defeat, BERKSHIRE
EAGLE (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.berkshireeagle.com/archives/savoy-wind-turbineproject-concedes-defeat/article_171edc77-6495-5f9a-be9c-f5a9bf542bce.html [https://per
ma.cc/2KXC-W8X6]. While the developer prepared the special permit application, the
community considered a bylaw that would thereafter limit the height of wind turbines to 350
feet. Given that the developer was proposing five 420-foot turbines, this proposed ordinance,
if passed, could frustrate the development. See Patrick G. Rheaume, Turbine Project
Exempt? BERKSHIRE EAGLE (July 7, 2006), https:/www.berkshireeagle.com/headlines/ci_40
22589/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20060710011147/https:/www.berkshireeagle.com/hea
dlines/ci_4022589/].
310
Roberts v. Manitowoc Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 721 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2006); see also Shippee v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Old Lyme, 466 A.2d 328
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1983) (affirming local ZBA’s granting of special permit for wind project
consistent with local ordinance).
306
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C. Adopting Preemptive State Wind Energy Siting Law
As documented above, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia
already have reserved some statewide jurisdiction over power generation siting.311
However, of this group, nearly all either do not preempt local government land-use
siting jurisdiction, 312 do not exercise state siting jurisdiction over typically-sized
wind power projects,313 or do not provide themselves authority over independent
non-utility “merchant” projects which undertake 80% of wind power
developments.314 When analyzed in this Article,315 only four states exercise effective
preemptive power over local ‘aesthetic’ zoning, which frustrates sustainable wind
power infrastructure siting. This is reductio ad absurdum.
This failure to exercise state control includes most U.S. states that have adopted
a 100% clean energy goal.316 A state can preemptively block certain new municipal
laws that would restrict additional wind power infrastructure.317 A third mechanism
to change the current dynamic of local control by tens of thousands of municipal
governments over whether or not sustainable renewable energy can be sited and
operated is for states to exercise authority over the power that their localities derive
from the state.318 In the majority of states which utilize Dillon’s Rule, states can
exercise state control over local siting of power generation because electricity is in
intra-state commerce and serves a statewide extra-municipal function.319
For example, that approximately one-third of states that have 100% renewable
energy goals, or even those states with renewable goals less than 100%, might
preempt local ‘aesthetic’ zoning, which eliminates wind turbines on a generic
blanket basis, and instead require an injured party to demonstrate proximate receptor
noise or similar nuisance.320 As a second example, the size designation in the statute
could be amended to include smaller-size wind technology project siting for the
twenty states that do not extend state jurisdiction coverage to smaller-size energy
projects that characterize many land-based wind generation projects.321
Massachusetts attempted the latter option—providing an example of how this
does or does not work. In 2008, Massachusetts passed the Green Communities

311

See supra Part III.C.
Id.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Id.
316
See Table of 100% Clean Energy States, supra note 35 (case law from these states
is discussed later in this Article).
317
See generally Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
318
See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 29, at 185.
319
Id.
320
See infra Part IV.D.2 (describing treatment of common law nuisance doctrine
regarding wind turbine projects).
321
See supra notes 233–255 and accompanying text.
312
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Act,322 and as part of this Act, a commission was formed to study why it was so
difficult to successfully develop on-shore wind projects in Massachusetts.323 The
commission discerned that the current siting process for Massachusetts required
prospective developers to get permits at the local and state levels.324
At the local level, a developer would typically need three permits: a zoning
permit, a building permit, and approval from the local conservation commission
established pursuant to state law which protects wetlands resources.325 Each permit
involves a separate process before a separate agency of local government in the host
town and each permit is subject to its separate appeal. This creates a lengthy process
to obtain the local permits required to begin wind turbine construction.
Beyond the local level, at the state level, the developer would then need to
obtain up to five permits, ranging from a Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act
(MEPA) certificate, Department of Public Utilities (DPU) zoning exemption,
approval for the transmission interconnection line from the wind project to connect
to the electrical grid, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) environmental
permit, and possibly a permit pursuant to the endangered species management plan
if endangered species were present or had potential or actual habitats in the project
siting area.326 Any state permit that is received is subject to appeal.327
This state commission studied six wind projects in Massachusetts and found
that the time elapsed from development to ready-to-build took anywhere from four
years to eleven years.328 These extreme time frames made it almost impossible to
convince developers to invest time and money into renewable on-shore wind energy
projects in Massachusetts. 329 The commission recommended a more streamlined
consolidated permit process similar to the existing approach used for in-state power
generating facilities over 100 MW in Massachusetts.330 Generating facilities over
100 MW already have a consolidated review process before the state Energy
322

An Act Relative to Green Communities, 2008 Mass. Acts Ch. 169,
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2008/Chapter169 [https://perma.cc/8P9X
-6BMX].
323
Id. at § 12.
324
TRC, NOBLE & WICKERSHAM LLP, & MEGDAL & ASSOCS., RENEWABLE ENERGY
SITING STUDY 2-1 (2009), https://www.mass.gov/doc/renewable-energy-siting-study2009/download [https://perma.cc/A5EU-PQ2W].
325
Id. at 4-24.
326
Id. at 4-3.
327
Id. at 2-3.
328
Id. at 4-29–30.
329
Id. at 3-1 (“Developers generally perceive Massachusetts as a difficult state to permit
wind facilities due in large part to the multiple permits that must be granted and the many
levels of appeal available to protect opponents.”).
330
Id. at 5-1.
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Facilities Siting Board.331 However, on-shore wind projects typically are not of this
large size and thus are blocked from using this consolidated state procedure.
In an effort to alter the current process, Massachusetts unsuccessfully attempted
to enact new legislation to streamline the permitting process for land-based wind
projects.332 These changes were aimed at wind generating facilities up to 100 MW
in size, which otherwise did not qualify because they were not greater than the
Massachusetts existing law 100 MW threshold. The proposed bills attempted to
consolidate the local review into one preemptive state process instead of having to
obtain multiple local permits and would establish a specific time frame for a decision
and appeals process to keep projects from lingering for many years.333
That proposed wind siting reform would break the process into two one-permit
steps: local review and a state permit.334 The bill first had the state Department of
Energy Resources (DOER) designate “significant wind resource areas” in order to
determine where physically the state should attempt to promote wind turbine
projects.335 Once a municipality area had been designated as a “significant wind
resource area,” it would be required to establish a local wind energy permitting board
within 30 days of receiving an application for a wind project.336
Each step in the permitting process would have exact time deadlines. The
municipality would have 60 days to determine if the wind application is complete
from the date it receives the application.337 If the application is complete, the next
step would be a 60-day window for the local permitting board to hold a public

331

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3.
See S.B. 1666, 187th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.B. 1759, 187th
Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.B. 1775, 187th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
(Mass.2011).
333
See sources cited supra note 332.
334
S.B. 1666, 187th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 1 (Mass. 2011) (“This act shall be
construed in a manner to achieve its public purposes, which are to encourage the
development of clean, renewable, electric generating plants and ancillary facilities powered
by wind, ensure that such facilities are sited in appropriate locations based on clear,
predictable and protective environmental, cultural and historic resource standards and
streamline the permitting of such facilities at the state and local level and reduce delays
associated with appeals of such permits.”).
335
Id. at § 2. Before a municipality is designated as such, they are allowed to hold a
public meeting and a period for public comment, but it is unclear what kind of ability a
municipality will have to stop the designation. Id.
336
Id. at § 3. The bill calls for the wind energy permitting board to be made up of either
three or five members and to consist of at least one member each of the zoning board,
planning board, and conservation commission. Id. The mayor or city manager will appoint
these positions. Id. The municipality can decide it is not feasible to have a wind energy
permitting board, but in that case the planning board would take the role the wind permitting
board was going to and must take input from the other local boards. Id.
337
Id. at § 4(c).
332
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hearing and a period for public comment. 338 Once the application had been
determined to be complete, a 120-day period would begin in which the permitting
board has to reach a final determination on whether to issue a permit for the wind
project. 339 If the board does not decide in 120 days, it would be considered a
constructive approval of the wind project application.340 This deadline restricts the
length of the entire process at the local level to a cumulative 180 days.
At the state level, the process would follow a similar procedure. Once the state
Energy Facilities Siting Board received an approved application from the local
board, it would have forty-five days to determine if the application is complete and
then 60 days to hold a public hearing and take comments from other state boards and
agencies that would have typically issued permits under the current system.341 The
Energy Facilities Siting Board would have to make a final decision within a
cumulative 275 days of determining that the application is complete.342 The overall
length of the process, including the local and state level processes together, would
be about a year and a half, much shorter than the four- to eleven-years projects were
found to require to obtain all the necessary permits for wind projects under the
existing system in Massachusetts.343
Groups complained that this reform legislation would pressure towns to fasttrack wind projects.344 The opposition groups also did not like the new permitting
board’s ability to waive local zoning laws.345 The commission’s study found that
many of the delays and appeals that affected these projects were not initiated by
residents or local groups but by outside third parties who were not directly affected

338

S.B. 1666, 187th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., Section 4(d) (Mass. 2011). During this
period the board can take comments from residents and other local boards, but the final
decision rests with the permitting board. Id. The permitting board is still required to enforce
all applicable local laws, but can waive zoning and non-zoning requirements, such as height
and noise restrictions that opponents of wind farms have historically used to block
development. Id. at Section 4(e).
339
Id. at § 4(f).
340
Id.
341
Id. at § 69V(c).
342
Id. at § 69V(f).
343
See TRC, NOBLE & WICKERSHAM LLP, & MEGDAL & ASSOCS., supra note 324, at
4-29.
344
See generally Financial Relief for Impacted Communities, WINDWISE MASS. (Aug.
10, 2021), http://windwisema.org/ [https://perma.cc/Z9HH-ANYA] (hosting complaints and
updates on wind turbine legislation).
345
Id.
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by the wind projects.346 The reform proposal did not limit the permitting boards’
abilities to deny an applicant.347
Another significant change the Wind Siting Reform Bill would have made is in
the appeal process regarding wind project proposals. Without any provision in law
consolidating appellate rights, currently, each permit a developer is required to
obtain individually is subject to its separate appeal. 348 The proposed reform bill
would have consolidated and truncated the appeal process, only allowing one
consolidated appeal at the local level and one at the state level. At the local level:
The local appeal of a decision approving a project would go to the state Energy
Facilities Siting Board rather than to court.349 An appeal of a local decision denying
a project would go to the Massachusetts Superior Court or Land Court.350
At the state level: An appeal of a state permit approval would proceed directly
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.351 This system would reduce the total
number of possible appeals to two that a project would have to contend with. Also,
if there was an appeal of a local decision, the EFSB was directed to include that
appeal in its proceedings as part of the state review and record. 352 This process
combined the state approval step with the local appeal process so that a project
would not get delayed sequentially by any local appeal. Questions existed as to the
local government board's ability to effectively or decisively deny wind projects if a
wind developer could appeal the local decision to the state board, which was looking
at the same wind project with a state board rather than local decision-makers.353
After many towns and cities complained to their elected state representatives
that this proposed state level of regulation of small power generation projects was a
usurpation of their inherent local land-use and siting authority, this legislation did
not pass in the state legislature.354 In recognition of the fact that a major barrier to

346

3-3.

347

See TRC, NOBLE & WICKERSHAM LLP, & MEGDAL & ASSOCS., supra note 324, at

S.B. 1666, 187th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011).
See infra text accompanying note 355. At the local level, a developer would typically
need three permits: a zoning permit, building permit, and approval from the local
conservation commission established pursuant to state law which protects wetlands
resources, each subject to it a separate appeal. See supra text accompanying note 325. At the
state level, the developer would need to obtain up to five permits, ranging from a
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) certificate, Department of Public Utilities
(DPU) zoning exemption, approval for the transmission interconnection line from the wind
project to connect to the electrical grid, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
environmental permit, and possibly a permit pursuant to the endangered species management
plan if endangered species were present or had potential or actual habitats in the project siting
area. Id.
349
S.B. 1666, 187th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 4(m) (Mass. 2011).
350
Id.
351
Id.
352
Id.
353
Id.
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Id.
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developing wind projects is local zoning laws, the Massachusetts Executive Office
of Environmental Affairs and the Division of Energy Resources created and
published a model zoning ordinance that, if adopted by communities, would allow
wind facilities to be sited if they obtained a local special use permit.355 Requiring a
special use permit enables communities to continue making case-by-case
determinations about projects, 356 with the rules of the game more balanced and
clearer for all involved.
With this proposed shift to state-level small wind project siting failing,
Massachusetts subsequently now is seeking an ongoing massive investment in
offshore large wind generation projects sited in federal waters in the Atlantic Ocean
off the Massachusetts coast, which would connect by undersea cable to the
Massachusetts power transmissions system.357 Off-shore ocean siting outside of any
local jurisdiction or zoning358 or use of special permitting on a case-by-case basis at
the local level359 in lieu of ‘aesthetic’ zoning is discussed in the sections above.
States retain an option to preempt, either totally or in part, the scope of zoning
powers that localities are allocated in Dillon’s Rule states or retain in Home Rule
states. For the twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia that already exercise
energy infrastructure siting power, this would constitute some shifting of regulatory
authority to the superior state level. In the other twenty-three states that have yet to
exercise state facility siting power, state siting power could be preemptive of local
authority. Massachusetts’ experience illustrates a less than fully preemptive
mechanism and ultimately successful political resistance from municipalities
wanting to retain full authority. A special permit option was set forth in Part IV.B360
and here as a means for states to re-format local land-use decisions for wind power

355

Mass. Dep’t of Energy Res. & Mass. Exec. Off. of Env’t Aff., Model Amendment to
a Zoning Ordinance or By-law: Allowing Conditional Use of Wind Energy Facilities,
MASS.GOV (June 2011), https://www.mass.gov/doc/smart-growthsmart-energy-bylawswind-power-wind-by-special-permit/download [https://perma.cc/BMK4-3WP4].
356
See supra Part IV.B.
357
Press Release, Exec. Off. of Energy & Env’t Affairs, Mass. Dep’t of Energy Res. &
Governor’s Press Off., Governor Baker Signs Climate Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, Protect Environmental Justice Communities (Mar. 6, 2021),
https://www.mass.gov/news/governor-baker-signs-climate-legislation-to-reduce-greenhou
se-gas-emissions-protect-environmental-justice-communities
[https://perma.cc/YG9M7735]. Legislation authorizes the Commonwealth to procure an additional 2,400 MW of
offshore wind power, bringing the state’s total required authorization to 4,000 MW of
offshore wind generation by 2027. Id. This constitutes a substantial share of Massachusetts
power demand. Id.
358
See supra Part IV.A.2.
359
See supra Part IV.B.
360
See supra note 306.
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siting on a case-specific basis. Below are ways for a Supreme Court decision and for
common law to shoulder and supplant some local ‘aesthetic’ zoning laws.
D. Using the Supreme Court Dean Milk Requirement; Reserving Common Law
Nuisance to Address Wind Generation Project Impacts
1. Supreme Court Minimum “Burden” Requirement
The Supreme Court held in Dean Milk that local governments using police
power should select the least restrictive means to implement local regulation for
public health and environmental purposes. 361 The Court found that the city of
Madison’s expressed concern for milk pasteurization was merely a guise to exclude
Illinois milk from the Wisconsin market. 362 The Court concluded that less
burdensome alternatives were available to the city of Madison with no effect on
interstate commerce.363 This Dean Milk requirement for a state or locality to justify
its regulation as implementing the least burdensome alternative has endured and
been elevated through federal court precedent for three-quarters of a century since
the Supreme Court decision.364
As one option going forward, a state could require its local communities’
zoning ordinances to comport with the Supreme Court decision in Dean Milk to be
the least restrictive regulatory ordinances. A broad exclusionary ‘aesthetic’ zone
prohibiting or restricting all wind power turbines for the benefit of distant citizens’
views is not the least restrictive form of regulation of environmental or aesthetic
interests. A less burdensome option for renewable energy commerce is to resort
instead to the local zoning special permit. 365 Or, if a wind turbine project has a
conventional nuisance impact, conventional nuisance actions can be employed to
address or compensate for that impact on any specific injured citizens.366
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Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
Id.
363
Id. at 354–55 (1951) (“If the City of Madison prefers to rely upon its own officials
for inspection of distant milk sources, such inspection is readily open to it without hardship
for it could charge the actual and reasonable cost of such inspection to the importing
producers and processors.”); id. (“A city cannot discriminate against interstate commerce
even in exercise of unquestioned power to protect health and safety of people, if reasonable
and non-discriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are
available.”).
364
See Fairmont Foods Co. v. City of Duluth, 110 N.W.2d 155, 156 (Minn. 1961);
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 383 F. Supp. 569, 570 (S.D. Miss. 1974), rev’d,
424 U.S. 366 (1976); White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emps., Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208
(1983); Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 831 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
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See supra Part IV.B.
366
See supra Part IV.D.2.
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2. Reactivating Common Law Nuisance Doctrine
There is a reason not to supplant common law nuisance rights by blanket
‘aesthetic’ zoning prevention of all wind turbines: Not all community citizens
oppose wind turbines. Data shows that “[t]hose who moved into the community
prior to [wind] project construction were less positive about the turbines’ fit with the
landscape . . . . The proportion who hold the perception that there is a negative effect
on property value is more than two and a half times greater among pre-construction
neighbors than post-construction.” 367 This data suggests that new neighbors are
more positive about living in the vicinity of an operating wind project. ‘Aesthetic’
wind zoning never allows the wind project to be sited and thus does not
accommodate more positive citizen values developed after construction of the
project. Common law always allows those who believe their property is injured to
make their individual case; ‘aesthetic’ zoning prohibitions never provide sustainable
technology a chance to be sited even on others’ distant land even if they constitute
no conventional nuisance.
Overlaying ‘aesthetic’ zoning to protect all views of distant people over lands
they do not own has the final effect of, and is akin to, a blanket determination that
wind turbines constitute a prohibited public nuisance. In common-law nuisance
claims, a plaintiff has the burden of proof and must demonstrate that actions are (1)
an invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land; (2)
intentional and unreasonable; or (3) unintentional and otherwise actionable under
the rules of controlling liability.368 Under both private and public nuisance law, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s activity unreasonably interfered with the
use or enjoyment of the plaintiff’s protected interest and caused the plaintiff
substantial harm. 369 Public nuisance actions have enjoined or remedied one’s
property damage by third-party hazardous waste, 370 water pollution, noise
pollution, 371 noxious odors, 372 and chemical contamination. 373 However, a view
shed in the distance that is not part of one’s property does not damage one’s property
or the ability to productively use one’s property.
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Aaron Russell & Jeremy Firestone, What’s Love Got to Do with It? Understanding
Local Cognitive and Affective Responses to Wind Power Projects, 71 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC.
SCI. 101833, at 9 (2021).
368
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
369
Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 2020).
370
See Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Van Tassell, 166 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460–61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1957).
371
Bd. of Health of City of Yonkers v. Copcutt, 35 N.E. 443, 446 (N.Y. 1893).
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See Baptiste, 965 F.3d.
373
See Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ill. 1981).
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Localities now employ ‘aesthetic’ zoning 374 as an equivalent route to the
outcome achieved after a successful public nuisance action enjoining another’s
otherwise legal use of his or her land. ‘Aesthetic’ zoning fundamentally alters the
delicate legal balance. Nuisance claims against wind turbines have been made based
on their proximate noise, vibrations, and any “strobe” or “flicker effect” of sunlight
relating to the wind project.375 In cold climates, wind turbines may throw ice from
their blades over a distance of several hundred meters onto adjacent properties when
spinning in winter.376 Wind power projects have been opposed at the local level in
many states because of alleged significant negative environmental impacts, 377
including alleged negative aesthetic and view impacts378 or the placement of wind
turbines in locations that could reduce the value of nearby property.379
A study by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory assessed the impacts on
residential property values of proximate wind power projects. 380 The perceived
374

See supra Part II.A, II.C.
Stephen Harland Butler, Headwinds to a Clean Energy Future: Nuisance Suits
Against Wind Energy Projects in the United States, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (citing Burch
v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 2007)).
376
David Wahl & Philippe Giguere, Ice Shedding and Ice Throw – Risk and Mitigation,
GE ENERGY (2006), https://www.ge.com/content/dam/gepower-new/global/en_US/downlo
ads/gas-new-site/resources/reference/ger-4262-ice-shedding-ice-throw-risk-mitigation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F483-KGEC].
377
See Eric Rosenbloom, The Low Benefit of Industrial Wind, AWEO (Jan. 20, 2006),
https://www.aweo.org/LowBenefit.pdf [https://perma.cc/RDF5-75A2] (addressing results of
a study of Irish wind power generation—specifically, that the “three problems that mitigate
the benefits of wind power” are a “large amount of extra energy required to start up thermal
generators that would otherwise not have been turned off[,] mechanical stresses of more
frequent ramping of production levels up and down[, and] increased prices of energy
necessary to pay for any lower usage of thermal plants”).
378
See id. (noting the size of wind turbines and indicating the necessity of flashing
lights for airplane safety).
379
See Jude Clemente, Do Wind Turbines Lower Property Values?, FORBES (Sep. 23,
2015, 10:28 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2015/09/23/do-windturbines-lower-property-values/?sh=70bf4cbf48cb
[https://perma.cc/EKW8-DMRL]
(providing reasons for opposition to wind turbines); see also Tom Gray, Wind Energy
Development Does Not Damage Property Values, REVE (Oct. 28, 2010),
https://www.evwind.es/2010/10/28/wind-energy-development-does-not-damage-propertyvalues/8048 [https://perma.cc/3TW9-3ML2] (summarizing the results of a study which
indicated that property values may actually increase as a result of nearby wind turbines); see
also Josh Gabbatiss, Windfarms Raise Incomes and House Prices in Rural US, Study Finds,
CARBONBRIEF (June 7, 2022), https://www.carbonbrief.org/windfarms-raise-incomes-andhouse-prices-in-rural-us-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/E64L-A9MC] (explaining that wind
turbines have not only increased house values, but also local incomes of residents).
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Ben Hoen, Ryan Wiser, Peter Cappers, Mark Thayer & Gautam Sethi, The Impact
of Wind Power Projects on Residential Property Values in the United States: A Multi-Site
Hedonic Analysis, 33 J. REAL EST. RSCH. 279 (2009); see also Allan Chen, No Evidence of
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impacts are described as area stigma, scenic vista stigma, and nuisance stigma.381
Large impacts on property value from proximate wind turbine construction were not
documented. 382 Those impacts that do occur are projected to occur within an
approximately one-half mile distance where turbines can be seen and heard. 383
Stigma impacts are a function of distance from wind turbines: The Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory Study concluded that if there is no view of a turbine and one is
more than one mile away, there is no documented area stigma.384 They also found
an absence of scenic vista stigma or nuisance stigma uniquely attributable to
residents in homes.385
States could restrict local ‘aesthetic’ wind zoning use by municipalities as long
as state common law nuisance remedies remain available on a case-by-case basis.
When a nuisance suit is filed, most courts utilize a balancing test to evaluate it.386
The test can vary pursuant to weighing the seriousness of the harm caused to a
neighbor by the nuisance against the social utility of the activity causing the harm.387
Where the harm caused outweighs the social utility, a nuisance occurs and is
found.388 To determine the severity of the harm, courts typically consider several
factors. When assessing the greater public utility of the nuisance-causing activity,
the court considers the extent of the harm involved, the suitability of the conduct to
the character of the locality, and the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the
invasive harm.389

Residential Property Value Impacts Near U.S. Wind Turbines, a New Berkeley Lab Study
Finds, BERKELEY LAB (Aug. 27, 2013), https://newscenter.lbl.gov/2013/08/27/no-evidenceof-residential-property-value-impacts-near-u-s-wind-turbines-a-new-berkeley-lab-studyfinds/ [https://perma.cc/M2F5-PBQ5].
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Hoen et al., supra note 380.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. (noting that the study analyzed more than 7,500 home sales near 24 wind
facilities in nine U.S. states and did not uncover any impacts to nearby home property
values).
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Id.
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Ryan Kusmin, Sucking the Air Out of Wind Energy: Nuisance Litigation and Its
Effect on Wind Energy Development, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 713 (2011).
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Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. L. INST. 1979)).
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Id.
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Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (AM. L. INST. 1979)).
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3. Distinguishing Common Law Nuisance from Zoning
The standard view of states’ common law holds that aesthetics alone cannot
form the basis of nuisance.390 There is nuisance law precedent surrounding wind
turbines. Non-view elements associated with wind turbines—noise, vibration,
flicker, or ice throws—could constitute a nuisance in a particular case. In Rose v.
Chaikin, the court held that the wind turbine was an actionable nuisance because its
particular output of noise was offensive due to its character, volume, and duration.391
Coming to a location after the nuisance is sited and operates makes it less likely to
exhibit a basis to require abatement of the nuisance. In Rassier v. Houim, with a
wind generator on his residential lot, it was held that anyone who comes to a
nuisance, as did the plaintiff, thereafter “has a heavy burden to establish liability.”392
Case decisions construing alleged public nuisance claims have not found the
‘special interest’ required to fashion remedies when the owner of land puts it to new
permissible uses and no immediate conventional physical nuisance affecting a
distant plaintiff is created.393 In Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, after testimony
that the wind turbine would obstruct some view, the court concluded that, “a district
court may consider the aesthetics of the wind turbine only if factors other than
unsightliness or obstruction of views are claimed.”394 Where the noise from the wind
turbine did not exceed an increase of 5 dBA over background levels measured at a
receptor located 100 feet from the turbine, however, the seventy-five feet height
close to the plaintiff’s property amounted to a nuisance and was entitled to a
remedy.395
In Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, various plaintiff homeowners lived
one-half mile to two miles from the planned 200 wind turbines.396 The Court held
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See generally Wernke v. Halas, 600 N.E.2d 117, 121–22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“[I]t
is well-settled throughout this country that, standing alone, unsightliness, or lack of aesthetic
virtue, does not constitute a private nuisance”) (citations omitted); Oliver v. AT&T Wireless
Services, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“The displeasing height and shape
of the new tower cannot, in and of itself, make it a nuisance to those who sit on the other side
of the property line.”); Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1, 1–2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (“It is
generally recognized that unsightliness, without more, does not create an actionable
nuisance.”).
391
Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982).
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that flicker or “strobe” effects from wind turbines and other aesthetic considerations
alone usually provide insufficient grounds for an actionable nuisance; noise is
sufficient to establish a nuisance, depending on its time, locality, and degree.397 In
Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, a key distinction between a traditional physical
nuisance invasion of a plaintiff’s real property by light, sound, odor, or foreign
substances was compared to an ‘aesthetic’ nuisance of a non-invasive interference
with the long-distance view from the plaintiffs’ property which was found alone not
to substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff’s land.398
Where Rankin did not find conventional physical interference nuisance claims
against a wind project, additional ‘aesthetic’ view claims alone were insufficient.399
The court in NedPower determined that a noise nuisance from a wind turbine alone
was a sufficient nuisance, and that ‘aesthetic’ view concerns alone are not a
sufficient nuisance factor, although once a physical noise nuisance is otherwise
established, such aesthetic concerns can be considered as an additional factor in
determining infringement on use and enjoyment of one’s land. 400 Each of these
nuisances is a function of physical proximity to an operating wind turbine that exerts
palpable physical effects that could appropriately be determined on a case-by-case
basis in a nuisance action.
‘Aesthetic’ zoning of a ridgeline, thus prohibiting wind turbine placement,
effectively presumes turbines are a nuisance and is not based on any case-by-case
application or plaintiffs sustaining a burden of proof of injury based on specific wind
project proposals or facts. Moreover, a local ‘aesthetic’ zoning ordinance shifts the
common law nuisance burden of proof placed on the allegedly affected plaintiff
instead to the wind property owner otherwise following the law on the use of its
land, who must undertake the extremely difficult task of taking on the entire city law
to overturn an established municipal zoning ordinance.401 ‘Aesthetic’ zoning can
function as a more burdensome regulatory intrusion in search of a problem already
capably addressed by nuisance law. 402 At a time when there is national and
international pressure urgently to address climate change by rapidly implementing
renewable power projects, local ‘aesthetic’ zoning laws apply a legal sledgehammer
when there are more precise tools available as mandated by the Court’s Dean Milk
precedent.403
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CONCLUSION
All cities and towns in the U.S. utilize electric power.404 Electric power needs
to be generated. Now, energized by larger issues of rapid climate change, the U.S.
and all nations must transition to lower-carbon-emission sources of power
generation, of which wind power currently is the most prominent and used
technology. Any community hostile to wind power can pass a highly restrictive
amendment to its zoning ordinance that makes the community unattractive or costprohibitive to wind or other power generation projects. There is no requirement
under state law for states to allow tens of thousands of cities and towns carte blanche
to elect to ‘zone-out’ the most prevalent renewable power generation technology
through ‘aesthetic’ zoning unless that specific wind power project also always
presents a legally recognized conventional nuisance injury to proximate citizens or
their properties. Ironically, the use of land for wind turbine power capture leaves
that land as open space without human habitation and increases the property tax base
realized and enjoyed by the town.
Each of the six innovative alternative pathways identified in Part IV could be
implemented within existing state authority without amending U.S. federal law or
the Constitution. Each would flexibly allow renewable electric power infrastructure
siting to proceed on a case-by-case basis, preserving all stakeholders’ rights under
existing common law and/or through requirements for developers to obtain local
land-use special permits. These innovative legal tools can support states to
contribute to decarbonizing the U.S. electric system at the rapid pace required to
rescue and preserve the world climate.
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See Access to Electricity (% of Population) – United States, WORLD BANK, (2022),
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[https://perma.cc/GC32-V5RT] (noting that 100% of the United States population had access
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Who Lack Access to Electricity?, POWER (Oct. 1, 2020), https://powermag.com/did-youknow-there-are-60000-u-s-citizens-who-lack-access-to-electricity/ [https://perma.cc/V8S6W6PL] (explaining that there are some Native American lands and elsewhere where about
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